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THE SHARING ECONOMY MEETS THE
SHERMAN ACT: IS UBER A FIRM, A
CARTEL, OR SOMETHING IN BETWEEN?
Mark Anderson and Max Huffman*
The sharing economy is a new industrial structure that is
made possible by instantaneous internet communication and
changes in the life, work, and purchasing habits of individual
entrepreneurs and consumers. Antitrust law is an economic
regulatory scheme dating back to 1890 in the United States
that is designed to address centrally controlled concentrations
of economic power and the threats that those concentrations
pose to consumer interests and economic efficiency. In order to
accommodate a modern enterprise structure in which thou-
sands or millions of independent contractors join forces to pro-
vide a service by agreement among themselves, antitrust law
requires re-envisioning and careful application. The success of
Uber, Airbnb, and other sharing economy firms, and the con-
sumer benefits that those firms promise, show both how diffi-
cult and how important that re-envisioning can be.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The sharing economy is a disruptive force challenging 'a
wide range of legal and institutional structures. Sharing econ-
omy platform companies like Uber and Airbnb connect thou-
sands of suppliers with millions of consumers every day. They
do this using instantaneous communication and massive in-
formation sorting technology to coordinate the actions of sup-
pliers and match them with consumers. In doing so, these
platform companies have altered the basic conception of what
constitutes a business firm. The resulting effect on antitrust
law and policy is ambiguous, with conflict between apparent
antitrust law concerns and evidence of massive consumer ben-
efits.1
Antitrust law has evolved over more than a century to reg-
ulate a marketplace occupied by firms. It uses a complex set
of rules to assess the economic effects of agreements between
firms, but leaves conduct within a firm subject to little scru-
tiny. In a traditional firm, owners contribute capital, manag-
ers make business decisions, and employees implement those
1 According to one study, "consumers always benefit from collaborative
consumption." Saif Benjaafar et al., Peer-to-Peer Product Sharing: Implica-
tions for Ownership, Usage, and Social Welfare in the Sharing Economy 3
(Oct. 6 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN).
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decisions. The sharing economy confronts antitrust law by dis-
aggregating the roles usually played by actors within a firm.
In the sharing economy, workers provide much of the capital.2
For example, Uber does not own a vast fleet of cars; its drivers
supply the cars. The workers can be subject to substantial con-
trol by the managers of the platform, but are not treated as
employees. This disaggregation takes activities that would
usually be subject to little antitrust scrutiny because they are
within a firm and subjects them to significantly greater anti-
trust scrutiny. Unthinking application of antitrust principles
developed for the traditional firm to the reconfigured eco-
nomic structures of the sharing economy is inappropriate.
Suppliers in a sharing economy enterprise reach agree-
ments with the platform company about the company's terms
of service. For example, sharing economy platforms nearly al-
ways include systems for making and receiving payment, im-
pose requirements for suppliers' relationships with consum-
ers, and establish a means for consumer reviews. Other terms
that are not as ubiquitous also exist. Some sharing economy
enterprises include agreements between suppliers and the
platform on the price to be charged. Some terms are competi-
tively neutral or procompetitive. Others, particularly includ-
ing agreements on price, are typically considered matters of
substantial antitrust concern.
Traditional black-letter antitrust law suggests alternative
approaches to how courts should treat a sharing economy en-
terprise. One approach is to consider the agreements between
suppliers and the platform to be "vertical agreements" subject
to a fairly lenient "rule of reason." Another approach is to treat
the agreements as a "hub-and-spoke" conspiracy, reflecting a
"horizontal agreement" among suppliers to the enterprise or-
chestrated by the platform. 3 If a horizontal agreement is
2 One study concludes that this operates to the benefit of below-me-
dian-income individuals, who are among the suppliers on sharing economy
platforms. See Samuel Fraiberger & Arun Sundararajan, Peer-to-Peer
Rental Markets in the Sharing Economy 4 (Sept. 10, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with SSRN).
3 See Julian Nowag, The UBER-Cartel? UBER Between Labour and
Competition Law, LUND EU L. REV., Fall 2016, at 94, 97,
862 COL UMBIA B USINESS LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 2017
No. 3:859] SHARING ECONOMY MEETS THE SHERMAN ACT
found, it will be subject to varying treatment depending on the
level of competitive sensitivity. Agreements on price-one of
the most competitively sensitive terms-may even be auto-
matically illegal. This exact question is currently before a dis-
trict court in New York in consumer antitrust litigation
against Uber.
This Article analyzes these alternative approaches, taking
account of leading authorities interpreting section 1 of the
Sherman Act, to conclude that a "quick look" rule of reason is
the most appropriate line of analysis for sharing economy
terms of service that present the greatest antitrust concerns.
Under the quick look approach, a plaintiff can easily demon-
strate the likelihood of anticompetitive effects and the defend-
ant must offer a procompetitive justification. "Per se" invalid-
ity remains possible but, in light of the unique benefits that
sharing economy enterprises produce, is unlikely. Terms of
service that touch on matters less competitively sensitive, in-
cluding payment terms and quality requirements for products
and services, will likely receive a full-blown rule of reason
analysis and be upheld under antitrust laws.
Beyond analyzing the application of traditional antitrust
principles to the sharing economy, this Article advocates a
new approach. Unique to a sharing economy enterprise is a
structure that resembles a single entity, yet remains a set of
agreements among highly diffuse individual actors. This
structure results in a sharing of economic risks among the
participants in the sharing economy enterprise, which can in-
centivize efficiencies in operation that ordinarily are found in
a single entity. This Article concludes that those efficiencies
can overcome anticompetitive concerns about coordination on
competitively sensitive matters. The resulting approach, rep-
resented by graphing the degree of risk-sharing in relation to
the degree of coordination, promises a superior analysis for
the application of section 1 of the Sherman Act to the sharing
economy.
[https://perma.cc/BW37-6E8D]; see generally Barak Orbach, Hub-and-
Spoke Conspiracies, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2016, at 1.
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Part II of this Article defines the sharing economy and sets
forth the economic analysis that separates it from the tradi-
tional economy. Part III examines the antitrust principles un-
der section 1 of the Sherman Act that assess agreements be-
tween firms. Part IV analyzes the application of these
principles to the sharing economy. Finally, Part V argues that
these principles should be altered for application to the shar-
ing economy. Specifically, Part V argues that the categorical
rules developed under section 1 should yield to an approach
based more on matters of degree. And in applying this matter
of degree approach, increased levels of coordination between
actors in the sharing economy should be allowed under section
1 because those actors share more economic risk with each
other than do actors in the traditional economy.
II. SHARING ECONOMY
This Part explains the sharing economy in terms that pre-
pare for an analysis of the antitrust consequences of sharing
economy firms. Subpart A defines the sharing economy, shar-
ing economy firms, and sharing economy enterprises by refer-
ence both to historic analogs and to information-age realities.
Subpart B discusses the economics of the sharing economy,
the four efficiencies that sharing economy firms all leverage
to varying extents, and the complementary ideas of regulatory
disruption and regulatory arbitrage. Subpart C examines the
structure and operation of sharing economy firms with partic-
ular emphasis on Uber, Airbnb, Lyft, Couchsurfing, and
TaskRabbit.
A. Defining the Sharing Economy
The sharing economy leverages resource cross-utilization.4
Terminology varies; the sharing economy has been denoted
4 See Akanksha Srivastava, Sharing Economy: Old World Renting
Meets New World Technology, LINKEDIN (July 5, 2016),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/sharing-economy-old-world-renting-meets-
new-akanksha-srivastava [perma.cc/JK2U-GHBU]. A substantial amount
of the information and analysis governing the sharing economy is found
online in the form of sophisticated news articles from outlets including
864 [Vol. 2017
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"the peer-to-peer economy," "collaborative consumption," "gig
economy," and "the access economy," among other terms. 5 All
terms describe a "decentralized model whereby two individu-
als interact to buy or sell goods and services directly with each
other, without intermediation by a third-party, or without the
use of a company of business. The buyer and the seller trans-
act directly with each other."6 Consistent with the November
2016 Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, "The Sharing
Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and Regula-
tors," (the "FTC Report"), this Article adopts use of the term
"sharing economy." 7
Some debate exists regarding the proper reach of the
phrase "sharing economy." More than one author questions
entirely whether it is appropriate in the context of for-fee ex-
changes. 8 The modern use of the phrase likely dates to 2007,9
but is most frequently identified with a 2008 Creative Com-
mons license text by Lawrence Lessig.1o Lessig defined the
sharing economy in juxtaposition to a commercial internet-
based economy. "[N]ot only is money not helpful. In many
CNET and the Huffington Post, as well as in the blogosphere. By necessity,
then, this Article includes more cites to blogs and other internet sources
than is usual for legal scholarship.
5 Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy As
an Alternative Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 243 (2015); FED.
TRADE COMM'N, THE "SHARING" EcoNoMY: ISSUES FACING PLATFORMS, PAR-
TICIPANTS, AND REGULATORS 11 (Nov. 2016) [hereinafter FTC REPORT],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/sharing-economy-is-
sues-facing-platforms-participants-regulators-federal-trade-commission-
staff/pl51200_ftcstaffreport on the sharing economy.pdf
[perma.cc/H6N8-UX6R].
6 See Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Economy, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/p/peertopeer-p2p-economy.asp [perma.cc/WN43-
QBC6].
6 See FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 11.
7 See FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 11.
8 See, e.g., NICHOLAS A. JOHN, THE AGE OF SHARING 69 (2016) (noting an
"often-heard critique" that sharing is distinct from renting); FTC Report,
supra note 5, at 10-11.
9 See John, supra note 8, at 72, 74 (citing sources from 2007).
10 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX (2008).
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cases, adding money into the mix is downright destructive."11
To Lessig in 2008, Netflix, Amazon, and Google are paradigms
of the internet-based commercial economy, while Wikipedia
and the Linux operating system are paradigms of sharing.12
Lessig penned his narrower definition before Uber and Airbnb
existed.13
Other (and more recent) scholarly analyses accept for-fee
services as part of the sharing economy. 14 Distinctions con-
tinue to be drawn between a resource use economic model, in-
cluding renting and fee-free sharing, and the transfer of own-
ership, including swapping, donating, and selling.1 5 For
purposes of antitrust analysis, distinctions between renting
and selling are immaterial.16 Distinctions between for-fee and
fee-free sharing are not likely to change the antitrust analysis,
which is broad enough to encompass non-financial transaction
terms. 17
The notion of sharing is not new. 18 The term "suggests the
possibility of a society in which resources are distributed
fairly."1 9 Long-standing examples of sharing include carpools,
a historic mechanism to conserve gasoline and to get around
11 Id. at 146 (footnote omitted).
12 Id. at 117-172.
13 Uber self-dates to 2009 and Airbnb self-dates to August 2008. See
Travis Kalanick, Uber's Founding, UBER (Dec. 23, 2010), https://news-
room.uber.com/ubers-founding/ [perma.cc/A23Q-9JSU]; About Us, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us [perma.cc/VYP6-7SVT].
14 See, e.g., Juho Hamari et al., The Sharing Economy: Why People Par-
ticipate in Collaborative Consumption, 2 J. Ass'N. FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH.
2047, 2047-50 (2015); RACHEL BOTSMAN & Roo ROGERS, WHAT'S MINE IS
YouRs: THE RISE OF COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTrION xvi (2010).
15 See Botsman & Rogers, supra note 14, at 3.
16 It is possible that a rental market will produce different competitive
effects than a market for sales. However, the arguments that this Article
makes about what section 1 standard to apply do not depend on those dif-
ferences.
17 Cf. Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the Not-
For-Profit Sector 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
12132, 2006) ("[P]romoting competition is socially valuable regardless of the
particular objectives of producers.").
18 See generally JOHN, supra note 8, at 75-76.
19 Id. at 76.
866 [Vol. 2017
No. 3:859] SHARING ECONOMY MEETS THE SHER MAN ACT
HOV restrictions on major commuting routes. For example,
the decades-old practice of "slugging" in Washington D.C. per-
mits sharing of unused seats in commuters' cars:
"Slugging" is a term used to describe a unique form of
commuting found in the Washington, DC area ....
The system of slugging is quite simple. A car needing
additional passengers to meet the required 3- person
high occupancy vehicle (HOV) minimum pulls up to
one of the known slug lines .... The slugs first in line
for that particular destination then hop into the car,
normally confirming the destination, and off they go.
No money is exchanged because of the mutual benefit:
the car driver needs riders just as much as the slugs
need a ride.2 0
The modern sharing economy relies on the internet to ac-
complish what slug lines have long achieved for commuting
into the nation's capital.2 1 Sharing economy enterprises have
emerged in a wide variety of marketplaces, ranging from con-
tent/information (YouTube, Wikipedia) and capital (Kick-
starter) to transportation, housing, and personal services
(Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit). One paper categorized 254
different enterprises meeting its definition of a sharing econ-
omy enterprise, 22 while another source noted 'about 600 peer-
to-peer startups."' 23 Most examples include sharing by trans-
ferring ownership, whether permanent or temporary, of cars,
homes, bicycles, 24 concert tickets, 25 and related personal or
real property.
20 See About Slugging, SLUG-LINES.COM (last updated Aug. 5, 2017
10:41 AM), http://www.slug-lines.com/Slugging/About-slugging.asp
[perma.cc[UL8D-DX5K].
21 See Kate Evans, How Technology Has Created a Shared Economy,
SOVTECH (Apr. 21, 2016), https://sov.tech/technology-created-shared-econ-
omy/ [perma.cc/T5BJ-5NY6].
22 Hamari et al., supra note 14, at 2050.
23 FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 13-14 (quoting FTC Workshop panelist
Chiara Farronato).
24 See, e.g., DONKEY REPUBLIC, http://www.donkey.bike
[perma.cc/565R-XFLY].
25 See, e.g., STUBHUB, https://www.stubhub.com [perma.cc/HUZ6-
4JJG].
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1. Sharing Economy Characteristics
The term "sharing economy" describes a platform-based
mode of exchange between consumers and suppliers. The plat-
form facilitates transactions that search costs and transaction
costs would otherwise prevent. In theory, the platform need
not be technology-based. The slugging example above dates
back more than forty years to the gasoline crisis in the
1970s. 2 6 Farmers markets and college dining hall message
boards have long served the matching service that sharing
economy firms provide today.27 However, technology has rev-
olutionized these historic matching systems. That is partly be-
cause the modern sharing economy developed concurrently
with the refinement of computer- and internet-based commu-
nication. 28 It is also because technology-based communication
methods are uniquely suited to minimize search and transac-
tion costs through rapid communication and comprehensive
data gathering and sorting.
a. Seven Defining Factors
In its November 2016 Report, Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") staff identified several key features of sharing econ-
omy enterprises. 29 First, the FTC recognized that a sharing
economy marketplace has three players: consumers, suppli-
ers, and the platform. 30 The platform is what is usually re-
ferred to as the "sharing economy firm." The FTC Report also
identified the following five factors: that consumers and
26 About Slugging, supra note 20.
27 See FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 11.
28 According to one source, from 2005-2015, the percentage of U.S.
adults using social media increased from 7% to 65%. Andrew Perrin, Social
Media Usage. 2005-2015, PEw RES. CTR. (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.pewinter-
net.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015
[https://perma.cclB6N4-8ANH]. This ten-fold increase coincides with the de-
velopment of Uber and Airbnb, founded in 2009 and 2008, respectively. See
supra note 13.
29 FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 16, 18-20.
30 Id. at 18.
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sellers are individuals or very small firms; 3 1 that sellers or
service sellers use existing personal assets and thus bear min-
imal costs of entry; that markets are sufficiently "thick" to en-
able liquidity; that the platform has appropriate procedures
to ensure safety and reliability; and that the platform charges
a fee or commission for its matching services. 32
This Article largely accepts the factors identified in the
FTC Report for purposes of the analysis in Parts I-V.33 How-
ever, the FTC Report fails to identify one recurring feature of
sharing economy enterprises-that of "regulatory disruption."
Regulatory disruption is sufficiently frequent and analytically
relevant to warrant treatment as a seventh factor. In the fol-
lowing section, this Article describes regulatory disruption
and its sibling, regulatory arbitrage. 34
In sum, the seven defining features of a sharing economy
marketplace are:
* Three players: consumers, suppliers, and plat-
form;
* Atomistic consumers and suppliers;
* Sellers face minimal entry and exit barriers by
avoiding specialized investment;
* Thick markets;
* Platform provides assurance of safety and reliabil-
ity;
* Platform charges fee or commission; and
31 This factor distinguishes sharing economy enterprises analyzed here
from "sharing" firms that are in reality engaged in short-term renting. See,
e.g., CAPITAL BIKESHARE, www.capitalbikeshare.com [perma.cc/EAG8-
HQA3]. Capital Bikeshare's assets are owned by a consortium of municipal-
ities in the Washington D.C. region. See Partners: Municipal Owners, CAPI-
TAL BIKESHARE, www.capitalbikeshare.com/partners [perma.cc/X7Y2-
PHTS].
32 FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 19-20.
33 One factor identified in the FTC Report-homogeneity of goods and
services-is subject to meaningful challenge. See id. at 19 (citing FTC Work-
shop panelist Liran Einav). Sharing economy enterprises such as Airbnb,
TaskRabbit, and Etsy, among others, involve substantial heterogeneity
with regard to products or services as well as prices and idiosyncratic con-
tract terms.
34 See infra Section II.A.2.
869
* Regulatory disruption.
b. Nomenclature
It is necessary to establish nomenclature for the partici-
pants in a sharing economy marketplace. The "sharing econ-
omy firm" is the platform. Firms do not employ the sellers,
affiliating instead on a contract basis-the legal question of
employment is not settled in the more centralized sharing
economies. 3 5 The "suppliers" are themselves individuals or
firms. Finally, the combination of the platform and the suppli-
ers is a "sharing economy enterprise," a phrase this Article
uses to escape the economic and antitrust law implications of
the word "firm." 36
2. Regulatory Disruption and Regulatory
Arbitrage
This Article defines a sharing economy marketplace to in-
clude the possibility of "regulatory disruption" as a means of
avoiding regulatory limits and the ensuing costs that burden
established firms. 37 Regulatory disruption and its sibling, reg-
ulatory arbitrage, 38 enable sharing economy enterprises to
achieve competitive scale through the growth of the combined
enterprise (platform plus suppliers) as opposed to entering as
a single firm with sufficient capital to bear the costs of regu-
lation. 39
35 See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
36 With regard to the economic question of firm definition, see infra text
accompanying notes 89-92 (discussing Coase in the context of the sharing
economy). With regard to the single-firm question in antitrust law, see infra
Part III.
37 See Nicholas P. Terry, Regulatory Disruption and Arbitrage in
Health-Care Data Protection, 17 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 143,
156-58 (2017).
38 See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REv. 227, 229
(2010).
39 See generally NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, U.S. SMALL Bus.
ADMIN., THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS 54-55 (2010),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/The%2OImpact%20of%2ORegula-
tory%20Costs%200n%2OSmall%2OFirms%20(Summary).pdf
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In general, regulatory disruption can be expected to occur
when the disruptive enterprise adopts a meaningfully differ-
ent enterprise structure, such that applying an existing regu-
latory framework is difficult or impossible.4 0 The privately op-
erated payment system Bitcoin is an example of one such
enterprise. Bitcoin employs an account-settling structure that
uses a decentralized block-chain technology entirely distinct
from the traditional means for settling accounts in U.S. pay-
ment systems. Bitcoin thereby avoids regulatory oversight it
might otherwise have borne had it followed a traditional cen-
tralized account settlement procedure. 4 1 Bitcoin developed as
a privately ordered payment system and, only after proving
its capacity for success at scale, faced the possibility of regu-
latory oversight. 42
Whether intentionally or otherwise, sharing economy en-
terprises take advantage of regulatory disruption to achieve
competitive scale. 43 For example, Airbnb began with short-
[perma.cc/J72S-8426]. The Crain & Crain study suggests substantial varia-
tion in the economic sector with a per-employee average across the economy,
suggesting that small firms bear substantially greater regulatory costs as a
result of not having achieved efficient scale.
40 See generally Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Compe-
tition in the Time of Algorithms, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1323 (2016).
41 See Felix Salmon, When Disruption Meets Regulation, REUTERS (Jan.
30, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2014/01/30/when-disrup-
tion-meets-regulation/ [perma.cc/S9NN-5669]; Primavera de Filippi, To-
morrow's Apps Will Come from Brilliant (And Risky) Bitcoin Code, WIRED
(Mar. 8, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/decentralized-applications-
built-bitcoin-great-except-whos-responsible-outcomes/ [perma.cc/EQ3W-
6VDQ] ("The actual innovation brought about by Bitcoin is not the currency
itself but the platform.").
42 See Primavera de Filippi, We Must Regulate Bitcoin. Problem Is, We
Don't Understand It, WIRED (Mar. 1, 2016),
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/must-understand-bitcoin-regulatel
[perma.ccl328S-U95H] ("With a 5 billion market cap, Bitcoin is slowly mak-
ing its way into the digital economy, and a growing number of merchants-
including Overstock, Newegg, Expedia, Dell and even Microsoft-are now
accepting Bitcoin as a possible form of payment for their products. Of course,
regulation will be needed eventually, both to address the risks and maxim-
ize the benefits of the technology.").
43 See generally Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for
Local Government Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the "Sharing
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term rentals of air mattresses. While probably immune from
scrutiny initially due to the de minimis scale, Airbnb also pre-
sented a lodging model that confounds the traditional regula-
tory scheme. 44 The typical Airbnb supplier is not a licensed
lodging enterprise, does not report income to the taxing au-
thorities, and may or may not make disclosures to its insur-
ance company. At the individual supplier level, Airbnb is ef-
fectively a gray market for housing.
Regulatory arbitrage, in contrast, does not rely on a novel
enterprise structure flying below the regulatory radar. Victor
Fleisher describes regulatory arbitrage instead as "a perfectly
legal planning technique used to avoid taxes, accounting
rules, securities disclosure, and other regulatory costs."4 5 For
instance, where employment law imposes costs in the form of
health care and social security coverage, firms may seek to
avoid treating its labor force as "employees" to avoid those
costs. 46 Where antitrust law imposes obligations to self-report
transactions over a certain size, firms may seek to conduct
transactions on a smaller scale.47
Sharing economy enterprises achieve characteristics of
large integrated firms. These enterprises achieve a substan-
tial "nexus of contracts" that establish terms among the con-
Economy" (Geo. Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 15-
01, 2015); Sofia Ranchordas, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Inno-
vation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J. L. Scl. & TECH 413 (2014).
44 See Roberta A. Kaplan, Regulation and the Sharing Economy,
N.Y.L.J. (July 18, 2014), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjour-
nal/almID/1202663656633 [perma.cc/3M62-BU9Z] (arguing "new technolo-
gies should not be banned outright simply because they cannot be neatly
shoehorned into traditional business or regulatory models").
45 See Fleischer, supra note 38, at 229.
46 Taxes and benefits on employee wages are commonly reported to in-
crease the cost of employment versus contracting by a multiple of 1.25-1.4.
See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 15-A, EMPLOYER'S SUP-
PLEMENTAL TAx GUIDE (2017).
47 See Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton
Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 8524 (Jan. 26, 2017) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 801-
803).
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stituent parts of the enterprise, as well as between the con-
stituent parts and third-party consumers. 48 Achieving firm-
like stature while retaining the convenience of an enterprise
comprised of independent contractors constitutes regulatory
arbitrage and possibly regulatory disruption. As the next Sub-
part demonstrates, sharing economy marketplaces present a
challenge to the Coasean distinction between intra-firm trans-
actions and marketplace transactions.
3. Features of Leading Sharing Economy
Enterprises
Platforms establish "terms of service" that govern relation-
ships between the platform and suppliers. These terms of ser-
vice also frequently regulate consumers' use of the platform
and the contracts between suppliers and consumers. The ex-
tent to which platforms exercise control over suppliers and
consumers via their terms of service varies. Table 1 below
identifies several key functions of such terms of service and
whether they are used by particular well-known platforms.
48 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
EcoN. 305 (1976) ("It is important to recognize that most organizations are
simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relation-
ships among individuals.").
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TABLE 1: PLATFORMS' TERMS OF SERVICE FEATURES
Uber Lyft ABB49 CS5o TR51
Establishes a price for X52 X53 X54
the service or product
provided
Controls the method of X X X X
payment over the plat-
form
Maintains a functional- X X X X55 X
ity for product or ser-
vice reviews
Sets minimum require- X
ments for the sup-
plier's personal or real
property used in the
transaction
Sets requirements X
meant to ensure com-
pliance with accessibil-
ity and other civil
rights laws
Disclaims control over X X
suppliers, including
49 Airbnb.
50 Couchsurfing.
51 TaskRabbit.
52 Subject to downward negotiation and, as of June 2017, tipping. See
In-app Tips on Uber, UBER https://www.uber.com/ride/how-it-works/tips/
[perma.cc/2AL6-6DMQ].
53 Subject to tipping. See How to Tip Your Driver, LYFr,
https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/2 13583978-How-to-tip-your-driver
[perma.cclVM7Q-H7SB].
54 Price is required to be zero. See How It Works, COUCHSURFING,
https://www.couchsurfing.com/#how-it-works [perma.cc/Y6GY-TKB9].
55 Referred to as "references," these are less robust than the review
functions of the for-fee sharing services discussed here.
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their manner of per-
forming a service or
providing a product
Collects taxes imposed X
by a particular locality
Ensures that realistic X X
alternative means ex-
ist for suppliers to
reach consumers
a. Uber
Uber first launched in 2010 as a small ride-share company
out of San Francisco under the name Ubercab. The company
was born in response to the difficulty of hailing a cab in San
Francisco and allowed users of the service to flip the script by
creating a means for drivers to come directly to those looking
for a ride. Ubercab grew in popularity despite its initially
higher costs, and eventually expanded into New York in 2011
as Uber. 56 Today, Uber self-reports operations in eighty-two
countries, 57 and valuation estimates for Uber range from 60-
56 Uber NYC Has Launched, UBER: UBERBLOG (May 4, 2011),
https://www.uber.comlblog/new-york-city/uber-nyc-launches-service/
[perma.cc/6ZPE-UHYD].
57 See International Sites, UBER, https://www.uber.com/country-list/
(last visited on Oct. 27, 2017).
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70 billion dollars. 58 According to the most recent comprehen-
sive survey in July 2016, Uber averages 15.8 million monthly
active users. 59
Uber's terms of service with consumers establish the plat-
form as a "technology company" and "matching service" be-
tween consumers and third party providers of, primarily, ride
services.60 Uber's driver contract (referred to on the Uber web-
site as "terms and conditions" 61) similarly limits Uber's role in
the transaction to that of "lead generation to independent pro-
58 See, e.g., Uber: The Road to a $69 Billion Valuation, WALL STREET
SURVIVOR (July 17, 2017), http://blog.wallstreetsurvi-
vor.com/2017/07/17/uber-road-69-billion-valuation/ [perma.cc/QYN7-
ZKEB]; Maya Kosoff, A Look Inside the Insanely Successful Life of Billion-
aire Uber CEO Travis Kalanick, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 6, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/inside-the-successful-life-of-billionaire-
uber-ceo-travis-kalanick-2015-7 [perma.cc/3J4E-C7YD]. As a privately held
company, such valuation is an estimation. It is frequently questioned. See,
e.g., Julie Verhage, An Expert in Valuation Says Uber Is Only Worth $28
Billion, Not $62.5 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2016, 1:32 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-17/an-expert-in-valua-
tion-says-uber-may-have-already-peaked [perma.cc/8V3K-5NSW].
59 See Mike Sonders, These Latest Uber Statistics Show How It's Dom-
inating Lyft, MEDIUM (Dec. 7, 2016) https://medium.com/@sm-app in-
tel/these-latest-uber-statistics-show-how-its-dominating-yft-53f6b255de5e
[perma.ccl7Q43-E9K5].
60 The Services comprise mobile applications and related services
(each, an "Application"), which enable users to arrange and schedule trans-
portation, logistics, delivery services, and/or purchase certain goods, includ-
ing with third party providers of such services and goods under agreement
with Uber or certain of Uber's affiliates ("Third Party Providers"). In certain
instances, the Services may also include an option to receive transportation,
logistics, and/or delivery services for an upfront price, subject to acceptance
by the respective Third Party Providers. Unless otherwise agreed by Uber
in a separate written agreement, the Services are made available solely for
personal, noncommercial use. U.S. Terms of Use, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/us/ [perma.ccl8M7U-CKUE].
61 Agreeing to Terms and Conditions, UBER
https://help.uber.com/hl44cflf0e-27ca-4919-9621-fl321a0381cl (last visited
Dec. 2, 2017).
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viders of rideshare or peer-to-peer (collectively, 'P2P') passen-
ger transportation services." 62 Drivers "acknowledge and
agree that Company is a technology services provider that
does not provide transportation services." 63 Uber further sets
terms governing the relationship between Uber and drivers as
well as the contract relationships between drivers and passen-
gers. 64 Of particular note, the Uber driver contract imposes
default fares, which drivers may negotiate down at their ini-
tiative.65 The agreement does not describe how such negoti-
ated fares would operate in reality, and there is some evidence
that downward fare negotiation is not a reality for ride shar-
ing on the Uber platform. 66 However, the contours of the Uber
pricing regime are not static and can be expected to change.
In June 2017, Uber added functionality allowing passengers
62 Raiser, L.L.C. Technology Services Agreement (Dec. 11, 2015),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2645988-RASIER-Technology-
Services-Agreement-Decmeber-10.html [perma.cc/QLT7-QBR6].
63 Id.
64 See id. at 3-7. These include requirements for use of Uber services;
contract termination based on ratings; Uber's role in establishing default
fares and collecting those fares; and drivers' status as independent contrac-
tors with limited control over driving by Uber. Under the heading "Use of
the Uber Services," the driver contract also dictates terms of the transac-
tions between drivers and passengers. These include communications be-
tween driver and passenger; driver's obligation to provide equipment and
services under the transportation agreement; driver's obligation to
transport service animals; ratings made by drivers of passengers and pas-
sengers' right to rate drivers; requirements for driver vehicles; "default"
fares to be charged, based on location of the ride; adjustments to fares based
on local market factors; and adjustments to fares based on driver conduct
including an inefficient routing.
65 Id. at 7. In the ordinary course, upward negotiation is not part of the
Uber pricing regime. Exceptions include negotiations on long-distance trips
and negotiations on multiple stop.
66 An Uber driver's forum, uberpeople.net, contains much discussion
about the apparent possibility of negotiating fares, but no indication that
any driver had ever actually exercised the apparent contract right to nego-
tiate a lower fare. See generally Jagman, We Can Negotiate the Fare, UBER-
PEOPLE (Feb. 14, 2017), https://uberpeople.net/threads/we-can-negotiate-
the-fare.141426/ [perma.cc/T3DL-WUL8] (containing a Melbourne, Aus-
tralia, driver discussion board).
877
to tip drivers, with the result that the total cost of a ride can
now be negotiated upward via a tip.67
b. Airbnb
In 2008, Airbnb was founded in San Francisco by three
founders who rented out air mattresses for use in their apart-
ment. They created a user-friendly website advertising the
space at a rate of $80 per person per night, an amount signif-
icantly less than local hotels. After three guests rented in a
single night, they decided to expand the idea.6 8 Airbnb now
connects people to a wide variety of spaces, including apart-
ments, homes, castles, and villas, in more than 65,000 cities
and 191 countries, with over three million listings world-
wide. 69 The success of Airbnb may be partially attributed to
its personalized customer service, competitive pricing, and
creative use of technology.
The Airbnb model is centered on short-term accommoda-
tions, where potential guests can browse available listings fil-
tered to meet their needs. For example, upon selecting a des-
tination, a potential guest can filter their search results to
specify room type-e.g., a private room, shared room, or entire
home-as well as price range. Once the selections have been
made, Airbnb displays to the user all accommodation profiles
that fit the specifications. These profiles are created by the
owner of the accommodation, and typically include photos, re-
views by other Airbnb users who have stayed at the accommo-
dation, and a description.70
Like Uber, Airbnb is a "platform" for matching service pro-
viders with consumers of services. 7 1 The platform charges fees
67 See Can I Tip My Driver With the App?, UBER,
https://help.uber.com/h/8459a496-5ed2-4f9d-bl5c-d8afd9ccf34f
[perma.cc/ZAF8-4PJ4].
68 See Anna Vital, How Airbnb Started, ADIOMA (Apr. 10, 2014),
http://fundersandfounders.com[how-airbnb-started/ [perma.cclX4VT-
7LWB].
69 About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us
[perma.ccG5K3-3ZYD].
70 See AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ [perma.cc/5U5G-U8P6].
71 According to Airbnb's Terms of Service:
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for its services. 72 Those fees are primarily imposed on the pro-
vider of services rather than on the consumer. Airbnb's other
roles in the financial aspects of the service transaction include
collecting payment from the consumer to make payment to the
provider and charging the consumer additional fees for dam-
age incurred. 73 Airbnb does not establish the price of the ser-
vice provided.
c. Other Examples
Lyft is another sharing economy firm supporting a ride
sharing enterprise by contract with driver/owners. Similar to
Uber, Lyft has a smart phone app that allows users to connect
with drivers in order to get to a destination of the passenger's
choosing. Lyft offers marginally greater flexibility in contract
terms than Uber; for instance, Lyft offers the option to tip the
driver through the app, a feature historically unavailable for
1.1 The Airbnb Platform is an online marketplace that ena-
bles registered users ("Members") and certain third parties
who offer services (Members and third parties who offer ser-
vices are "Hosts" and the services they offer are "Host Ser-
vices") to publish such Host Services on the Airbnb Platform
("Listings") and to communicate and transact directly with
Members that are seeking to book such Host Services (Mem-
bers using Host Services are "Guests") ....
1.2 As the provider of the Airbnb Platform, Airbnb does not
own, create, sell, resell, provide, control, manage, offer, de-
liver, or supply any Listings or Host Services. Hosts alone
are responsible for their Listings and Host Services. When
Members make or accept a booking, they are entering into a
contract directly with each other. Airbnb is not and does not
become a party to or other participant in any contractual re-
lationship between Members, nor is Airbnb a real estate bro-
ker or insurer. Airbnb is not acting as an agent in any ca-
pacity for any Member, except as specified in the Payments
Terms.
Terms of Service, AIRBNB (last updated June 19, 2017),
https://www.airbnb.com/terms [perma.cc/78YD-FKEY].
72 See Payment Terms of Service, AIRBNB (June 19, 2017),
https://www.airbnb.com/terms/payments-terms [perma.cc/4G42-5TKH].
73 See id.
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Uber drivers (although this has recently changed). 74 Drivers
may serve as suppliers in both the Uber and Lyft enterprises
at the same time, and some evidence exists that this is not
uncommon. 75
Another sharing economy firm is Couchsurfing. Couchsurf-
ing provides a platform for hosts to spotlight an empty space
for travelers. Couchsurfing classifies itself as a hospitality and
social networking centered site. The amenities available vary,
although most frequently guests receive, as the name implies,
a couch. Accommodations listed on Couchsurfing are free. The
articulated mission of the platform is to create a space that
allows people to "share lives, create connections, offer kind-
ness, stay connected and to leave it better than you found it."76
Couchsurfing became for-profit in 2014.77 But Couchsurfing
continues to connect suppliers and consumers for fee-free ac-
commodations and specifically prohibits suppliers from charg-
ing for use. 78 Couchsurfing disclaims any role in transactions
except for serving as a matching service. 79
74 See Uber vs Lyft: A Side-By-Side Comparison, RIDESTER (last up-
dated Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.ridester.com/uber-vs-lyft/
[perma.cc/3ZFC-MPTT]. See supra note 66 for details of Uber's policy
change.
75 See id.
76 See Our Values, COUCHSURFING, http://www.couchsurf-
ing.com/about/values/ [perma.cclLMC7-KXYV].
77 See The Rise and Fall of Couchsurfing, NITHIN COCA (Mar. 27, 2013)
http://www.nithincoca.com/2013/03/27/the-rise-and-fall-of-couchsurfing/
[perma.cc/B9Q6-3BMZ].
78 According to the Couchsurfing policies:
3. Don't Charge for Your Couch: Our community offers free
exchange of hospitality. Asking for money or labor in ex-
change for your couch, or referring members to paid accom-
modation services, is not allowed.
Couchsurfing Policies, COUCHSURFING, http://www.couchsurf-
ing.com/about/policies/ [perma.cc/65WT-EE5T].
79 The Couchsurfing terms of use state:
Our Services provide a platform for members to learn about
one another, arrange stays and travel, engage in activities
and communicate with one another. Couchsurfing is not a
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Finally, TaskRabbit provides a matching platform for
small-to-medium chores requiring moderate skills, including
packing for moves, furniture assembly, home cleaning, gen-
eral handyman work, personal assistant work, closet organiz-
ing, and research, among others. The platform connects sup-
pliers, called "Taskers," with consumers. Taskers list their
services for a price on the platform and TaskRabbit facilitates
the transaction. Of the enterprises detailed in this Subpart,
TaskRabbit exercises the least control over the transactions
between suppliers and consumers. It allows for ratings, con-
trols payments, and imposes warranties of timeliness, quality
and skills, and expertise on the Taskers.o
B. Economics of the Sharing Economy
Transactions occur where the gains, net of search arid
transaction costs, are positive for both parties (and superior
to alternatives).8 1 The transactions such as ride sharing and
casual lodging services that are taking place in the sharing
economy today may not have occurred historically because the
search and transaction costs exceeded the potential gains. By
party to, has no involvement or interest in, makes no repre-
sentations or warranties as to, and has no responsibility or
liability with respect to any communications, transactions,
interactions, disputes or any relations whatsoever between
you and any other member, person or organization. You are
solely responsible for your interactions with other members
of our Services. We reserve the right, but have no obligation,
to monitor interactions between you and other members of
our Services.
Remember, the Couchsurfing Services are just a platform
that enable you to communicate and interact with other peo-
ple around the world. We cannot be responsible for the in-
teractions that you have with other Couchsurfing members,
so please use good judgment and keep safety in mind when
you use our Services.
Terms of Use, COUCHSURFING, (last updated July 19, 2017),
http://www.couchsurfing.com/about/terms-of-use/ [perma.cc/98XS-5ZXN].
s0 See TaskRabbit Terms of Service, TASKRABBIT (last updated June 1,
2017), https://www.taskrabbit.com/terms [perma.cc/42ML-77KF].
81 FTC REPORT, supra note 5, at 18.
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reducing those search and transaction costs, the sharing econ-
omy has enabled transactions that could not occur in a pre-
internet economy.
1. Efficiencies in the Sharing Economy
Sharing economy firms succeed by leveraging several key
efficiencies, including efficiencies of:
* the online platform;
* low search and transaction costs;
* regulatory disruption and arbitrage; and
* small scale.82
All of the sharing economy enterprises detailed in Subpart
A above operate entirely through online communication. For
example, an Uber rider does not contact the firm through a
brick-and-mortar store-front. Even online communication is
channeled to maximize efficiency. The Uber website landing
page lacks a "contact us" link. 83 Once Uber uses its online plat-
form to establish relationships with drivers and riders, it is
extremely efficient in connecting drivers with riders. This se-
cond efficiency may be Uber's primary reason for quick suc-
cess. It replaced an outdated labor-intensive system of match-
ing taxi drivers with riders through telephones and dispatch
centers. Likewise, Airbnb's matching service, which takes
place online and through its smartphone app, reduces search
and transaction costs relative to traditional marketing chan-
nels.
Other efficiencies are not inherent to the business model,
but are instead the result of sharing economy firms' status as
disruptors. Because these firms are sufficiently unlike exist-
ing providers in their industry, they may end run anachronis-
tic regulatory schemes that date back decades, if not more
than a century, to the development of the original industry.
Uber demonstrates the reality of hopeless anachronism in the
82 See generally Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies
& Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb
and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293 (2016).
83 See UBER, https://www.uber.com/ [perma.cc/C59H-ZMNJ].
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system of taxicab medallions and rate regulation for taxi
fares. Other enterprises, such as Airbnb and TaskRabbit, may
fail to collect state or local taxes or satisfy other regulatory
requirements such as licensure. Initial small scale allows
sharing economy firms to prove new business models to both
venture capital firms and regulators, while operating under
the radar until larger operating scale is achieved. These effi-
ciencies permit sharing economy enterprises to make mean-
ingful dents in revenues in their respective industries with the
benefits flowing to consumers. 84
2. Both Centralized and Competitive
Sharing economy enterprises confound regulation that is
designed to control centrally coordinated unitary firms.85
These enterprises can achieve massive scale. By one estimate,
the total value of Uber's bookings for its core business line ap-
proached $20 billion in 2016.86 Uber achieves that value while
avoiding both ownership costs for the primary capital invest-
ment-the cars-and responsibility as an employer for salary
and benefits to its drivers. Instead, Uber acts as facilitator for
a substantial market populated by individual competitors. 87
The definitional characteristics of a sharing economy mar-
ketplace include its capacity to bring together atomistic sup-
pliers and consumers transacting around relatively homoge-
nous goods and services. The technology that supports the
84 See Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Esti-
mating the Impact of Airbab on the Hotel Industry (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Mgmt.,
Research Paper No. 2013-16, 2014).
85 See generally Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the
Sharing Economy, 53 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 149-51 (2016).
86 See Tyler Durden, Uber's Massive Cash Burn Problem: 2016 Loss Set
to Hit a Record $3 Billion, ZEROHEDGE (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.zero-
hedge.comInews/2016- 12-20/ubers-massive-cash-burn-problem-2016-loss-
set-hit-record-3-billion [perma.cc/Z5ED-Z2P5] (reporting approximately $5
billion quarterly in revenue from rideshare bookings).
87 As a practical matter, selecting a driver on Uber is not a trivial task.
Riders must first hail a ride and, if the driver is not to their liking (for ex-
ample, if the rating score is low), the rider must cancel the ride within the
allowed five-minute time period and hail another ride.
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enterprise mitigates historic limitations on information avail-
ability. Thus, a sharing economy marketplace may better
achieve the idealized perfectly competitive state. Each sup-
plier faces a flat demand curve, representing infinite elastic-
ity. The, competitors provide the enterprise with both labor
and capital, two of the three factors of production. The com-
petitors also play a decision-making role in their small part of
the enterprise over matters such as where to operate, what
parts of the day to offer services, and-for instance, in the case
of Uber-when to service or replace the vehicles.
Sharing economy enterprises do not escape the need for
centralized coordination, however. The platforms exercise
varying levels of control over suppliers. At one extreme, some
platforms exercise very little control and merely allow con-
sumers and suppliers to find each other. For instance, well-
known platform eBay exercises limited control over suppli-
ers. 88 Of the enterprises considered in Subpart A, TaskRabbit
is the least coordinated. At the other extreme, a platform may
establish prices and other terms of service. Uber is an example
of this higher level of centralized control. The more coordina-
tion that exists, the more the sharing economy enterprise pre-
sents itself to consumers as a unitary entity. This distinction
between competition and monopoly is essential to understand-
ing the antitrust implications of sharing economy market-
places, discussed further in Parts III-V.
3. Disrupting the Coasean Firm
Eighty years ago, Ronald Coase set out to define a firm.
Coase distinguished between coordination within a firm and
88 See EBAY, https://www.ebay.com/ [perma.cc/8SXD-N4CD]; see also
ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/ [perma.cc/36LG-Y5YY]. Controls over suppli-
ers on eBay, for example, include a short set of "listing conditions," a list of
"prohibited and restricted items," and intellectual property rules (ignoring
the contract terms between eBay and its suppliers). See eBay User Agree-
ment, eBay, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html#6
[perma.cc/4MRL-S4Q7]. This two-page set of terms governs a marketplace
with approximately $84 billion in yearly transactions. See EBAY, 2016 AN-
NUAL REPORT 4 (2017).
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market transactions between firms.89 Coordination within a
firm was characterized by an entrepreneur who gave direction
to employees. The entrepreneur controlled which employees
did what and how they did it. If employees did not want to
follow these directions, they could quit. In market transac-
tions, on the other hand, the firm purchased goods and ser-
vices without the power to direct how these goods were pro-
duced or services rendered. The firm paid a price for an
outcome specified in the contract. Coase reasoned that entre-
preneurs would choose between intrafirm coordination and
market transactions depending on which offered the best
tradeoff of costs and benefits. At the height of the industrial
age, large manufacturing firms raised huge amounts of money
to build large factories where they directed the work of thou-
sands of laborers to produce steel, cars, and trains.
Sharing economy enterprises realign the ownership and
control structure by minimizing the cost of marketplace trans-
actions and reducing the need for aggregating large amounts
of capital within a single firm. Transactions previously more
efficient when centrally coordinated have become efficient as
marketplace transactions. 90 Entrepreneurial control remains
within the firm. However, as a matter of definition, sharing
economy enterprises outsource labor to independent contrac-
tors. 9 1 Capital ownership is also outsourced, with sharing
economy firms contracting with the owners of cars, apart-
ments, bicycles, tools and equipment, or other real or personal
property, to rent or sell those assets using the platform. Thus,
the enterprise may enjoy many of the efficiencies of an inte-
grated firm while also gaining the efficiencies of marketplace
89 See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
90 See Anders Hansen Henten & Iwona Maria Windekilde, Transaction
Costs and the Sharing Economy, 18 INFO 1, 6-9 (2016).
91 As a legal matter, this is subject to continued debate and litigation.
See, e.g., Mumin v. Uber Techs., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 3d 507 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)
(assessing a claim for denial of rights through misclassifying drivers as in-
dependent contractors and denying motion to dismiss in part). See generally
Erin Mulvaney, Regulators & Lawyers Race to Respond to a Thriving Gig
Economy, NAT'L L.J. (Aug. 1, 2017) https://www.law.com/nationallawjour-
nal/almlD/1202793484793 [perma.cc/BSM4-L4WP].
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transactions. 92 The net result is that individuals supply the
capital and the labor, while the platform supplies the market-
ing and varying levels of control.
The Article turns in Part III to an examination of the core
antitrust rules that govern firms and transactions in the U.S.
economy. Those rules' application in the context of the sharing
economy is a matter of existential importance for some or all
of these firms.
III. SHERMAN ACT STRUCTURE
Federal antitrust law has controlled the legal assessment
of competitive behavior for more than 125 years. The Sherman
Act is the principal vehicle for that assessment. The basic
structure of the Sherman Act divides competitive behavior
into classifications and subjects each class to different levels
of assessment. Some behavior is automatically lawful. Other
behavior is automatically unlawful. The legality of still other
behavior depends on its economic effect in the particular cir-
cumstance. The Act uses two variables to achieve this differ-
entiation. First, the Act treats conduct differently depending
on whether it is the product of an agreement. The Supreme
Court has developed complex rules about when an agreement
will be deemed to exist and how different agreements will be
assessed. Second, the Act treats conduct differently depending
on whether the actor(s) have or are close to possessing market
power.
Doctrinally, the Act uses a complex set of elements to as-
sess the effects of agreements and market power. Section 1
condemns agreements that unreasonably restrain trade, pro-
hibiting "[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in
92 See Dyal-Chand, supra note 5, at 267 ("Sharing markets, and the
sharing economy more broadly, seem to violate the claims of Coase and
Demsetz ... . [W]hy do these individuals neither join firms nor go it alone
... ?"); see generally Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and the
Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (discussing the different em-
phasis on marketplace transactions over hierarchical structure presented
by sharing economy enterprises).
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restraint of trade . . . ."93 The requirement of a contract, com-
bination or conspiracy is referred to as the agreement or con-
certed action requirement. For more than one hundred years,
the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the restraint
of trade element to prohibit only restraints that are unreason-
able. 94 Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization
and attempted monopolization. 95 Monopolization requires
power over price and untoward conduct to acquire or maintain
that power. 96 Attempted monopolization occurs when an actor
is dangerously close to monopoly power, has the specific intent
to monopolize, 97 and takes predatory steps toward that end. 98
Since sharing economy actors are pioneers in potentially dis-
ruptive incursions into existing markets, the possession of or
dangerous proximity to monopoly power seems less likely
than the potential for anticompetitive contracts. 9 9 Therefore,
this Article will focus on analysis of antitrust concerns arising
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
93 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
94 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-62
(1911).
95 15 U.S.C § 2 (2012). Section 2 also prohibits conspiracies to monopo-
lize. See id. This prohibition has little practical importance since such a con-
spiracy would already be illegal under § 1.
96 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) ("The
offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful ac-
quisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or de-
velopment as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or his-
toric accident.").
97 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993).
98 See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 149 (1951).
99 Monopolization has been alleged against one sharing economy enter-
prise, Uber, in federal lawsuits in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and
in the Northern District of California. See Phila. Taxi Ass'n, Inc. v. Uber
Techs., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 389 (E.D.Pa. 2016) (attempted monopolization
claim dismissed for lack of standing); DeSoto Cab Co. v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
No. 16-CV-06385 (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 2, 2016). The claim in the Northern
District of California is unlikely to succeed due to difficulties alleging and
proving monopoly power.
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A. The Agreement Requirement
Agreements and conspiracies are familiar concepts in ar-
eas of the law as diverse as contracts and criminal law. How-
ever, the competitive policies underlying the Sherman Act
have given rise to a specialized body of law. First, the Act has
been interpreted to insulate conduct within a single firm from
scrutiny under section 1. Second, some conduct between firms,
which is in some sense collaborative, is sometimes deemed
unilateral.
The single entity fiction protects intrafirm conduct. The
thousands of people involved in the business decisions of a
large publicly held corporation as officers, directors, and em-
ployees are each individual actors. If they got together to sell
cocaine or pursue a terrorist attack, they would be guilty of
criminal conspiracy. The existence of the corporation would
not insulate them from guilt. However, under the Sherman
Act, those actors are deemed to be a single entity and incapa-
ble of conspiring with each other while they pursue the firm's
interests. Two modern Supreme Court cases explore the
boundaries of this doctrine. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independ-
ence Tube Corp.,100 a parent corporation and its wholly-owned
subsidiary were alleged to have conspired in violation of sec-
tion 1. Previous opinions of the Court had stated that such a
conspiracy was possible.101 After considering the policy be-
hind the concerted action requirement, the Court held that a
conspiracy between a parent corporation and its wholly-owned
subsidiary was not possible under section 1.102
In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,103
the Court returned to the single entity fiction. The thirty-two
team members of the National Football League were alleged
to have agreed among themselves when the NFL licensing
100 See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
101 See e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 229 (1947);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 212-
13 (1951).
102 See Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 768-72.
103 See American Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S. 183
(2010).
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arm granted an exclusive license to Reebok to use team trade-
marks on caps.104 Of course, the contract between the league
and Reebok was itself an agreement subject to scrutiny under
section 1. However, a horizontal agreement among the teams
would be subject to separate, more searching, scrutiny. After
examining the holding and policy discussion in Copperweld,os
the Court held that the league members were not joined to-
gether in a single entity. They were therefore capable of con-
spiring with one another for purposes of section 1.106 The
Court reasoned that the league members did not have a suffi-
cient unity of economic interest to constitute a single entity
for Sherman Act purposes. 107
Determining whether more than one entity exists is only
the first step in an agreement analysis. The next question is
whether those firms have entered into an agreement. Some-
times this is easy. Two or more firms may enter into an ex-
press contract. Similarly, an organization may adopt rules to
govern the conduct of its members. 08 Other times the agree-
ment question is factually or legally more difficult. Factually,
firms may deny that they ever talked to each other or other-
wise communicated and were unconcerned with each other's
conduct. Legally, courts may be called upon to determine
whether interdependent conduct constitutes an agreement.
Both of these issues were raised in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly.109 The plaintiffs there alleged that the defendant
telecommunications companies had agreed to divide the coun-
try into territories and refrain from competing with one an-
other. The defendants argued that the complaint failed to ad-
equately allege the agreement. At one level this is a
straightforward factual dispute. Did the defendants communi-
cate with one another and divide up the market? The Court
104 Id. at 187.
105 Id. at 194-95.
106 Id. at 201.
107 Id. at 197-202.
108 See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof' Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 683 (1978).
109 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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held that the complaint did not adequately allege that they
had.110 At another level, the dispute requires answering a
complex legal question.
Conduct by two or more firms can be divided into three cat-
egories. Firstly, they may enter into a communicated agree-
ment. Secondly, they may act completely independently; they
may refrain from communicating and be unconcerned about
each other's behavior. Finally, firms may act in an interde-
pendent manner. Interdependence arises when firms observe
each other and react to each other's behavior. The relevance
of interdependent behavior under section 1 has been discussed
for more than a half century. 1 1 1 In Twombly, the Court stated
that interdependent behavior does not constitute an agree-
ment. 112
In summary, an agreement under section 1 requires two or
more firms to enter into a communicated agreement. These
questions of law and proof regarding the agreement question
are critical to understanding the treatment of sharing econ-
omy enterprises under the Sherman Act. These enterprises
present questions of both (1) single entity status and (2) inde-
pendence, interdependence, or coordination of conduct. Of
course, not every agreement between two or more firms is il-
legal under section 1. Agreements are illegal only if they un-
reasonably restrain trade.
B. The Unreasonableness Requirement
Although the text of section 1 literally prohibits every
agreement in restraint of trade, the Act has long been inter-
preted to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade.113
The unreasonableness of an agreement may be demonstrated
in either of two ways. Some agreements are unreasonable per
110 Id. at 566.
111 See Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sher-
man Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655,
671-72 (1962).
112 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553-54.
113 See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).
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se. 114 Other agreements are subject to the rule of reason that
assesses the competitive effect of the agreement in the partic-
ular situation. Per se illegal agreements include price fixing115
and market allocation by competitors.11 6 It was the per se rule
against market allocation by competitors that was at issue in
Twombly.11 7 The per se rules against price fixing and market
allocation by competitors demonstrate that the antitrust laws
are generally more concerned about agreements among com-
petitors. These agreements are referred to as horizontal
agreements.
1. Defining the Categorical Prohibition of Per Se
Rules
Whenever the law defines a rule based on a category of con-
duct, the definition of that category becomes crucial. Per se
rules against horizontal price fixing and market allocation re-
quire that the agreement be among competitors. However, the
law further divides horizontal agreements and subjects only
some of them to the per se rule. The Supreme Court has some-
times struggled with determining the exact parameters of the
horizontal per se rules. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
114 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
886 (2007).
115 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940)
("Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with
the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a
commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.").
116 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) ("One
of the classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an agreement between
competitors at the same level of the market structure to allocate territories
in order to minimize competition."). In addition to price fixing and market
allocation by competitors, the Supreme Court has sometimes stated that
boycotts and tying are per se illegal. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (assessing boycotts); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (assessing tying).
117 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550-51. Because Twombly was decided on
the question of whether an agreement existed, the Court did not address
the question of the reasonableness of the conduct.
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Broadcast System, Inc., 11 8 CBS claimed that the defendant
copyright pools had violated the per se rule against horizontal
price fixing. The defendants were pools of copyright owners
who combined to offer a blanket license to all of the copyrights
in the pool. The blanket license was priced by the pool. This
arrangement involved a horizontal agreement by competitive
licensors of copyrights and did determine the price of the blan-
ket license. Thus, in the plaintiffs view, the agreement was
per se illegal as horizontal price fixing.
The Court held that since the agreement was price fixing
only in the "literal sense," it was not subject to the per se
rule. 11 9 The Court noted that the blanket license was not
something that any of the copyright holders could sell them-
selves.120 Competition among copyright holders for licenses to
their individual copyrights remained unaffected by the agree-
ment to form the copyright pools and offer the blanket li-
cense. 121 Thus, the parameters of the per se rule against hor-
izontal price fixing were refined in BMI. In addition to
horizontality in the agreement and an effect on price, an
agreement is per se illegal as price fixing only if it affects the
price at which the parties will sell something that they could
have sold individually. 122 This process of refinement is poten-
tially in play whenever the law uses a categorical rule. The
parameters of the rule must be defined to advance the policy
behind the rule. If a categorical rule cannot be defined in such
a way that it advances the policy behind the rule, the categor-
ical approach should be rejected.
118 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979).
119 See id. at 8.
120 Id. at 23. ("ASCAP does set the price for its blanket license, but that
license is quite different from anything any individual owner could issue.").
121 See id. at 23-24.
122 See also Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356
(1982) (focusing on whether the agreement affected the price of goods or
services that the parties to the agreement could have sold individually also
controlled the outcome).
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2. Reducing the Number of Per Se Rules
During the last forty years, the Supreme Court has re-
duced the number of per se rules and overturned several that
condemned agreements that were not horizontal. An agree-
ment between a buyer and a seller is referred to as a vertical
agreement. The simplest form of a vertical agreement is a con-
tract of sale which merely sets the price in the sale transac-
tion. Obviously, an ordinary contract of sale does not violate
the Sherman Act. However, sometimes a seller seeks to con-
trol the resale of the product by the buyer. The seller may
want to control how much the buyer charges on resale. Such
an agreement is referred to as resale price maintenance. The
seller may want to control to whom the buyer resells the prod-
uct. Such a restriction might be geographic or based on some
other classification of customers. These agreements are re-
ferred to as vertical non-price restrictions on distribution.
Starting in 1911, minimum resale price maintenance was con-
demned as a violation of section 1.123 Maximum resale price
maintenance was condemned as per se illegal in 1968.124 In
1967, the Supreme Court applied a per se rule to vertical non-
price restrictions.1 25 Between 1977 and 2007, all of these per
se rules were overturned and replaced by assessment under
the rule of reason. 126 This trend toward reducing the number
of per se rules and increasing the application of the rule of
reason has important consequences.
123 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877 (2007).
124 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968), overruled by
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
125 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381-82
(1967), overruled by Cont'l TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977).
126 See Cont'l T.V, 433 U.S. at 36 (holding that vertical non-price re-
strictions are subject to the rule of reason); State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 3 (hold-
ing that maximum resale price maintenance is subject to the rule of reason);
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. at 877 (holding that minimum re-
sale price maintenance is subject to the rule of reason).
893
Since vertical agreements to set resale prices and allocate
markets are subject to the rule of reason, it becomes crucial to
distinguish them from horizontal agreements allocating mar-
kets or setting prices. For example, if Toyota entered into
agreements with each of its dealers requiring the dealers to
sell a Camry for a specified price from a specified location,
those agreements would be subject to the rule of reason. How-
ever, if two or more Toyota dealers agreed with each other to
sell Camrys at an agreed upon price or to refrain from locating
their dealerships near each other, those agreements would be
per se illegal.
Therefore, the agreement requirement discussed in the
previous part is not only important as a threshold element for
any scrutiny under section 1. It is also important for deter-
mining what type of agreement is present. As in American
Needle, the existence of one agreement is sometimes easy to
determine. There it was the contract between the NFL licens-
ing entity and Reebok. That agreement would be vertical in
nature since it was between a licensor and a licensee of intel-
lectual property. As a vertical agreement, it would be subject
to the rule of reason. The issue in the case was whether, in
addition to this vertical agreement, a horizontal agreement
was also present. The Court determined that the teams were
separate entities capable of conspiring together. Of course, the
teams were in a horizontal relationship as potentially compet-
ing licensors of their own trademarks. A horizontal agreement
that eliminated competition between these potential competi-
tors and gave rise to the agreement with Reebok would be sub-
ject to closer scrutiny under section 1 than the vertical agree-
ment would be standing alone.
3. The Rule of Reason: Fast and Slow
Agreements that are not per se illegal under section 1 are
subject to assessment under the rule of reason. The rule of
reason involves a potentially complex analysis of the compet-
itive effects of the agreement. Instead of taking a categorical
approach, the rule of reason attempts to assess the legality of
an agreement by determining the potential anticompetitive
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and procompetitive effects of the alleged agreement. This mat-
ter of degree approach avoids the necessity of defining a cate-
gory of illegal conduct. However, the matter of degree ap-
proach does require an assessment of both potential
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects and netting those
effects against each other. This process can involve complex
allocations of burdens at different stages of the assessment.
The threshold question in a rule of reason case is whether
the plaintiff has presented enough evidence of anticompetitive
potential to shift the burden to the defendants to present a
possible procompetitive justification. In three cases, the Su-
preme Court concluded quite quickly that the plaintiffs had
met this burden. In National Society of Professional Engineers
v. United States,127 the defendant association had adopted a
rule that prohibited its members from engaging in competitive
bidding. The Court concluded that because the agreement af-
fected prices, the plaintiff had demonstrated the anticompeti-
tive potential of the agreement.1 28 In NCAA v. University of
Oklahoma,129 the defendant association had limited the num-
ber of football games that could be broadcast on television. It
also sold groups of games to broadcast networks for package
prices. The Court concluded that the agreement had sufficient
potential for an adverse effect on competition to require the
defendant to offer a justification.1 30 Finally, in FTC. v. Indi-
ana Federation of Dentists,131 the defendant association had
adopted a rule that forbid its members from providing insur-
ance companies with patients' x-rays when submitting a
claim. The Court held that such an agreement was potentially
anticompetitive without an elaborate analysis.1 32 These three
cases are examples of a "quick look" approach to the threshold
127 Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
128 Id. at 692.
129 Nat'1 Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85 (1984).
130 Id. at 113.
131 FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
132 Id. at 459.
895
question in a rule of reason case. However, not all rule of rea-
son cases are suitable for this quick look approach to that
threshold question.
In California Dental Association v. FTC,133 Justice Souter
and Justice Breyer debated when a quick look approach to the
threshold question under the rule of reason was appropriate.
In a five-four split, Justice Souter's view that a quick look ap-
proach was inappropriate in that case prevailed. The defend-
ant association had adopted a set of rules that appeared to be
aimed at false advertising by dentists. However, the rules had
been applied to prohibit advertising prices as low, across the
board discounts and quality claims. 13 4 The question before the
Court was whether that finding was enough to shift the bur-
den to the defendant to offer a procompetitive justification.
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, held that the agency
had not met its burden of establishing a sufficient likelihood
of anticompetitive effects to shift the burden to the defend-
ant. 13 5 Justice Breyer disagreed. He argued that the anticom-
petitive potential of the advertising restrictions required the
defendant to present evidence of procompetitive effects.1 3 6
Determining whether the plaintiff has demonstrated suffi-
cient likelihood of anticompetitive effects is not the only diffi-
cult question in applying the rule of reason. If the plaintiff has
made the required demonstration, the burden shifts to the de-
fendant to offer a justification for the agreement. This justifi-
cation must focus on the procompetitive effects of the agree-
ment. This requirement proved difficult for defendants in
some of the cases discussed above. In Professional Engineers,
the defendant association tried to justify its ban on competi-
tive bidding by arguing that competitive bidding would lead
to poor quality engineering. 13 7 The Court rejected this defense
as asserting that competition would lead to negative conse-
quences rather than arguing that the agreement enhanced
133 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
134 See id. at 783.
135 Id. at 778.
136 Id. at 784 (Breyer, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137 Nat'1 Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693
(1978).
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competition, and explained that "the Rule of Reason does not
support a defense based on the assumption that competition
itself is unreasonable." 138 Similarly, in Indiana Federation of
Dentists, the defendants argued that giving the insurance
companies access to the diagnostic x-rays would lead to nega-
tive results. 139 Citing Professional Engineers, the Court re-
jected this argument as an attack on the concept of competi-
tion rather than an argument that the agreement furthered
competition. 140 Finally in NCAA, the defendants argued that
the agreement restricting the number of games on television
was necessary in order to preserve ticket sales for live attend-
ance at football games.141 The Court rejected this argument
since it was based on the assumption that live ticket sales
could not compete with televised games in the absence of the
restraint.14 2 Citing Professional Engineers, the Court rejected
this argument.1 43
In summary, the basic structure of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act is based on three categorical rules backed up by one
matter of degree rule. The first categorical rule is the single
entity fiction. The single entity fiction requires that two or
more entities that meet the requirements of the rule exist. The
rule is categorical since it attempts to define a set of criteria
for what is a single entity. It is a fiction since it ignores the
actual people within each defined entity. The second categor-
ical rule is the requirement that the entities engage in a com-
municated agreement. This rule establishes a parameter that
excludes interdependent behavior from the definition of an
agreement. The third categorical rule is the per se rule, which
renders conduct illegal without regard to its effects. Per se
rules define sets of agreements that are automatically illegal.
Each per se rule has its own set of parameters. The back-up
matter of degree rule is the rule of reason. If conduct is not
138 Id. at 696.
139 FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462-63 (1986).
140 Id. at 463.
141 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 115 (1984).
142 Id. at 117.
143 Id.
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legalized by the single entity fiction or the exclusion of inter-
dependent behavior from the definition of an agreement and
is not condemned by a per se rule, its competitive effects are
analyzed by the shifting burdens of the rule of reason.
The net effect of the combined impacts of these rules is to
strongly encourage some types of cooperation while strongly
discouraging other types of cooperation. Cooperation within a
firm is strongly encouraged, since it is automatically legal un-
der section 1. Similarly, cooperation by interdependence is
strongly encouraged since it too is automatically legal under
section 1. However, achieving cooperation through agree-
ments that are subject to a per se rule is strongly discouraged
since a court will not hear any procompetitive arguments in
support of such agreements. If an agreement is subject to the
rule of reason, it is discouraged to the extent that a plaintiff
will be able to quickly shift the burden to the defendant to of-
fer a procompetitive justification and to the extent that the
defense arguments are based on asserting that competition is
itself harmful.
This discussion of the structure of section 1 lays the foun-
dation for analyzing its application to sharing economy enter-
prises. Part IV undertakes that analysis.
IV. APPLYING THE SHERMAN ACT TO THE
SHARING ECONOMY
The preceding part described the structure of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. This section will analyze the issues pre-
sented in applying section 1 to sharing economy arrange-
ments. The analysis proceeds by asking four questions. First,
are the participants in a sharing economy arrangement sepa-
rate firms capable of conspiring for purposes of section 1? Se-
cond, what is the nature of the agreements among these
firms? Third, are any of these agreements subject to a rule of
per se illegality? Fourth, how are any other agreements to be
assessed under the rule of reason?
These issues are not merely academic. A purported class
action made up of consumers of Uber's services has sued Uber
CEO Travis Kalanick, alleging a horizontal conspiracy be-
tween Kalanick and other Uber drivers to use Uber's pricing
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algorithm to fix the price of rides.14 4 "Plaintiff claimed, in es-
sence, that Mr. Kalanick, while disclaiming that he was run-
ning a transportation company, had conspired with Uber driv-
ers to use Uber's pricing algorithm to set the prices charged to
Uber riders, thereby restricting price competition among driv-
ers to the detriment of Uber riders, such as plaintiff Meyer." 14 5
Judge Rakoff noted the many features of the Uber enter-
prise that led to the high level of coordination among the driv-
ers, effected through the Uber platform, including the de facto
lack of individual price negotiation (despite the permissibility
of downward deviation from algorithmically established
prices).14 6 Rejecting Uber's argument that the Uber driver
agreements were individual vertical agreements with Uber
and not a horizontal agreement with one another, the District
Court noted the historic judicial recognition of hub-and-spoke
conspiracies in antitrust. 147 The District Court denied the mo-
tion to dismiss the claim of a price fixing conspiracy.1 48 This
Article considers below how the law of section 1, described in
detail in Part III, above, should be applied to sharing economy
enterprises like Uber.
A. Agreement Analysis
The threshold question in a section 1 analysis is whether
the participants in any coordinated behavior are separate en-
tities capable of entering into an agreement under section 1.
144 See Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 819-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
145 Id. at 820.
146 Id. at 820-21.
147 Id. at 824 (citing Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S.
208 (1939) and United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015)). A
hub-and-spoke conspiracy is an agreement reached between two or more
parties who communicate through a common third party (the hub) although
they may not actually communicate with each other. See In re Disposable
Contact Lens Antitrust, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2016).
148 The application of an arbitration clause in the Uber passenger
agreement with passengers has recently been analyzed by the U.S. Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. That court concluded that the arbitration clause
was valid and enforceable, remanding to the District Court on the question
of waiver. See Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017).
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When the Supreme Court addressed this question in Copper-
weld, it determined that a parent corporation and its wholly
owned subsidiary were a single entity for purposes of section
1.149 When the Court addressed the question of whether the
teams belonging to the National Football League comprised a
single entity in American Needle, it reached the opposite con-
clusion.150 In both cases, the Court focused on whether the ac-
tors were pursuing a unified economic interest. "The officers
of a single firm are not separate economic actors pursuing sep-
arate economic interests, so agreements among them do not
suddenly bring together economic power that was previously
pursuing divergent goals."1 51 "Although NFL teams have com-
mon interests such as promoting the NFL brand, they are still
separate, profit-maximizing entities, and their interests in li-
censing team trademarks are not necessarily aligned."15 2
Actors joining in a sharing economy arrangement are each
pursuing their own separate economic interests and are there-
fore not protected by the single entity fiction. Uber and each
of its drivers are separate economic actors; some of these ac-
tors might make money while others suffer losses. Uber takes
a piece of each driver's revenue but does not share each cost,
and the drivers share neither revenues nor costs. The same is
true for Airbnb and each of its property owners.
1. Types of Sharing Economy Agreements
Concluding that participants in the sharing economy ar-
rangements are separate entities capable of conspiring under
section 1 is only the first step in the agreement analysis. The
next step is determining whether the parties have entered
into any agreements. Of course, some agreements in sharing
149 See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 101-105.
151 Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769, 771
(1984) ("[Tjhe coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsid-
iary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the
Sherman Act. A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete
unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate . . . .").
152 American Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 198
(2010).
900 COL UMBIA B USINESS LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 2017
No. 3:859] SHARING ECONOMY MEETS THE SHERMANACT
economy arrangements are easy to spot. For example, Uber
drivers enter into express agreements with Uber that contain
complex terms related to insurance, driving record, nature of
the vehicle, and payment methods. Similarly, riders agree
with Uber by accepting terms and conditions when signing up
for the Uber app. 153 These agreements include terms related
to the nature of the vehicle, locations served, and payment
methods. Beyond these express agreements, other agreements
are also possible.
One might consider the driver and the rider to be in an
agreement. Under this conception, Uber is providing a match-
ing service. It tells both drivers and riders that it will help
them find each other and that it will coordinate the terms of
their deal. This conception of the arrangement characterizes
Uber as selling a service both to drivers and to riders. It is
compensated for this service by the difference between what
the rider pays and what the driver receives. In pure contract
law terms, identifying an agreement between the driver and
the rider seems straightforward. The rider sends a trip re-
quest. The driver accepts the request. The terms of the deal
are set by the Uber terms and conditions of service. These
agreements are very benign from a Sherman Act perspective.
Uber is selling a matching service to both drivers and riders,
and the driver is selling a transportation service to the rider.
These sale agreements are vertical agreements between con-
sumers and suppliers. Vertical contracts of sale are not anti-
competitive. Rather, they are the basic mechanics of a market
economy.
2. Horizontal Agreements Among Suppliers?
An important question is whether the Uber drivers should
be viewed as in agreements with one another. Among sharing
economy enterprises, Uber imposes the most substantial con-
trol over suppliers. When accepting the terms and conditions
as an Uber driver, each driver is agreeing with Uber. Are they
also agreeing with one another? From a purely contractual
153 U.S. Terms of Use, UBER (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.uber.comlle-
gal/terms/us/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
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perspective, the answer seems to be no. The drivers never di-
rectly communicate with one another, and none of the drivers
make an offer that is accepted by another driver. However,
this contract law determination does not control the Sherman
Act question.
The Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations and
conspiracies in restraint of trade. 154 The concept of a conspir-
acy is not limited to contractually enforceable promises. Fur-
ther, the word "combination" is more commodious than the
confines of an enforceable contract. The agreement analysis of
Uber's coordination of driver activity is similar to, but differs
from, other well-known agreement contexts. This Subpart
considers (1) vertical restrictions on distribution, (2) member-
ship organizations, (3) horizontal joint ventures, and (4) joint
sales agencies.
a. Vertical Restrictions on Distribution
One well known context for Sherman Act agreements in-
volves restricted distribution imposed by sellers on reselling
buyers.155 Sherman Act analysis of restricted distribution by
the Supreme Court goes back more than a century. 156 As dis-
cussed in the previous part, in restricted distribution a sup-
plier tells a buyer where, to whom, and/or at what price the
buyer may resell. While at various points in history these
agreements were illegal per se, current law subjects them to
the rule of reason.157 Vertical agreements about territories,
customers, or resale price need to be distinguished from hori-
zontal agreements about these same topics. Agreements
among competitors, horizontal agreements, allocating territo-
ries or customers, or fixing prices are per se illegal.158 Thus,
154 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
155 See supra text accompanying notes 122-125.
156 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877 (2007).
157 See supra text accompanying notes 122-125.
158 See supra text accompanying notes 114-115.
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the distinction between vertical agreements restricting distri-
bution and horizontal agreements determines whether the
agreements are per se illegal or subject to the rule of reason.
A manufacturer may agree with each of its retailers about
where, to whom, and for how much the retailers may resell
the manufacturer's products, and these vertical agreements
may be lawful under the rule of reason. 159 However, if those
same retailers agree with each other about any of those topics,
their agreement is per se illegal. The fact that the manufac-
turer has entered into a set of vertical agreements with its
retailers by itself does not mean that the retailers are in an
agreement with each other. Such a horizontal agreement
would need to be established by other facts.1 60
Well-established law permits a plaintiff to prove a horizon-
tal agreement effected by a set of seemingly unilateral vertical
agreements. In Interstate Circuit v. United States, the Su-
preme Court recognized that a horizontal conspiracy might
arise through a scheme orchestrated at one level of the chain
of distribution. This horizontal conspiracy by vertical agree-
ment could arise if the offer was accepted by more than one
actor at a different level of chain of distribution who recog-
nized that its competitors had also been offered and were ac-
cepting the agreement.16 1 Plaintiffs made this argument in
opposition to Uber's efforts to dismiss the consumer suit alleg-
ing a horizontal conspiracy. 162 The Second Circuit recently af-
firmed a finding of liability for an Interstate Circuit-like, ver-
tically orchestrated, horizontal agreement. In Apple e-Books,
the Department of Justice succeeded in convincing the Dis-
trict Court that Apple, an e-book retailer, had orchestrated a
price-fixing agreement among e-book publishers. 163 The Se-
cond Circuit affirmed, noting the historic acceptance of hub-
159 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. at 877; Cont'l T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
160 See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 n.4
(1988).
161 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1929).
162 See Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
163 See United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 690-91
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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and-spoke conspiracies that do not necessitate express agree-
ment among horizontal competitors. 164
Sharing economy arrangements do not literally fit the ver-
tical restricted distribution mold. Uber does not sell a good to
the drivers that the drivers then resell to the rider. Therefore,
the agreement that the Uber's drivers all charge the same
price for the service they sell to the rider does not involve a set
of vertical resale price maintenance agreements. Rather, Uber
merely provides a matching service that helps drivers and rid-
ers find one another. The drivers then provide a service to
their riders at a price established by the Uber algorithm.
b. Membership Organizations
Another familiar context for the analysis of agreements un-
der section 1 involves membership organizations. In a line of
cases that date back to 1918, the Supreme Court has con-
cluded that the members of such an organization are all party
to an agreement, 165 and declined to characterize such ar-
rangements as a set of individual agreements between the or-
ganization and each member. For example, the Court con-
cluded that members of the Indiana Federation of Dentists
agreed with each other to withhold x-rays from insurance
companies. 166 The Court also concluded that thousands of
members of the National Society of Professional Engineers
164 See United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 314 (2d Cir. 2015).
165 See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
166 The relevant factual findings are that the members of the
Federation conspired among themselves to withhold x rays
requested by dental insurers for use in evaluating claims for
benefits, and that this conspiracy had the effect of suppress-
ing competition among dentists with respect to cooperation
with the requests of the insurance companies. As to the first
of these findings there can be no serious dispute: abundant
evidence in the record reveals that one of the primary rea-
sons-if not the primary reason-for the Federation's exist-
ence was the promulgation and enforcement of the so-called
'work rule' against submission of x rays in conjunction with
insurance claim forms.
FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 455 (1986).
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agreed together to refrain from competitive bidding.16 7 Simi-
larly, the Court deemed the college members of the NCAA to
be in an agreement to restrict the number of televised football
games and establish prices for those broadcast rights.168 The
Court also viewed an agreement among the physician mem-
bers of the Maricopa County Medical Association to charge no
more than the prices fixed by the Association as horizontal
and per se illegal.16 9 Members of each of these organizations
agreed to abide by the rules established by the organization.
Each of these agreements existed among the members and
were horizontal in nature.
However, the sharing economy arrangements do not liter-
ally involve membership organizations. Uber is not a club
with members. It is a seller of a service to both drivers and
riders, and part of this service is establishing the price that
the drivers will charge the riders. Unlike membership organ-
izations, Uber drivers are not literally joining a group or
agreeing to abide by the rules that the group imposes on its
members.
c. Joint Ventures
A third familiar context for the analysis of agreements un-
der section 1 involves joint ventures. In a production joint ven-
ture, two or more firms agree to cooperate in producing a prod-
uct or service. These firms may or may not have been
167 Nat'l Soc'y of Prof' Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)
("In this case we are presented with an agreement among competitors to
refuse to discuss prices with potential customers until after negotiations
have resulted in the initial selection of an engineer.").
168 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984) ("By participating in an association which prevents
member institutions from competing against each other on the basis of price
or kind of television rights that can be offered to broadcasters, the NCAA
member institutions have created a horizontal restraint-an agreement
among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one an-
other.").
169 Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982)
("The agreement under attack is an agreement among hundreds of compet-
ing doctors concerning the price at which each will offer his own services to
a substantial number of consumers.").
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competitors prior to the formation of the venture. The Su-
preme Court analyzed a production joint venture in Texaco,
Inc. u Dahger,170 in which two oil companies, Texaco and
Shell, agreed to combine their gasoline refining assets. The
joint venture produced and owned the gasoline, which it sold
under the Texaco and Shell trademarks. 1 71 The plaintiff al-
leged that the agreement constituted per se illegal price fixing
by competitors. The Court held that the per se rule did not
apply since the gasoline sold pursuant to the agreement was
jointly owned by the firms in the venture. 172 Essentially, Tex-
aco and Shell shared the profits made from the sale of the gas-
oline that they jointly owned through the venture. The hall-
mark of such a joint venture is that the agreeing parties
jointly produce a good or service. The sale of this jointly owned
good or service produces profits (or losses) that are shared by
the venturers.
In a sharing economy arrangement, the agreeing suppliers
do not jointly produce a good or service that they jointly sell.
Rather, the agreeing suppliers jointly market goods or ser-
vices separately produced by the suppliers-for example, each
individual Uber driver provides rides to separate riders. There
is no joint production of the underlying service. Some individ-
ual Uber drivers may make profits while other drivers may
suffer losses.
d. Joint Sales Agencies
Perhaps most analogous to a sharing economy arrange-
ment is a joint sales agency. In Appalachian Coals v. United
States,173 a group of coal companies formed a corporation to
act as their sales agent. The agent had authority to set the
prices at which the coal was sold. 174 The Court treated this
agreement as existing among the coal companies.1 75 Although
170 Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
171 See id. at 4.
172 Id at 8.
173 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1984).
174 Id. at 358.
175 Id. at 364.
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this arrangement is broadly analogous to sharing economy ar-
rangements, there are distinctions. For example, Uber drivers
did not form and do not own Uber. Instead, Uber is a separate
company seeking its own profits. However, it is unclear
whether this distinction should make a difference. Each driver
knows that there are other drivers simultaneously agreeing
with Uber. Uber tells each of the drivers that all of the drivers
will be charging the price determined by the Uber algorithm.
Each driver agrees to this arrangement.
In summary, the Uber arrangement seems more analogous
to the organization cases and the joint sales agent cases than
the joint venture cases or the vertical restriction on distribu-
tion cases. Unlike a joint production venture, Uber and its
drivers do not jointly own the production produced by their
coordinated behavior. Unlike a vertical restriction on distri-
bution, Uber does not produce something that is then resold
by its drivers. Like the organization cases, drivers agree to
common terms governing each of their conduct. And like the
joint sales cases, drivers produce the service that is then mar-
keted and priced by Uber. This tends to indicate that the Uber
drivers are in an agreement with each other. A horizontal
agreement among suppliers in a sharing economy enterprise
raises the possibility of a determination of per se illegality or
quick look treatment under the rule of reason. The following
Subparts consider these possibilities."
B. Is the Uber Arrangement Per Se Illegal?
Concluding that Uber drivers are in an agreement with
each other is the first step in analyzing the potential applica-
tion of the per se rule against horizontal price fixing. The next
step is determining whether that agreement results in the
drivers all charging the same price. As discussed in Part II,
the current Uber terms and conditions make the price deter-
mined by the Uber algorithm a "default" price. However, Uber
has not implemented any mechanism through which the driv-
ers can conveniently inform riders of their willingness to ac-
cept less (or demand more) than the "default" price. When a
driver accepts a trip request and arrives to pick up a rider,
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there is no incentive for the driver to accept less than the "de-
fault" price. Therefore, the agreement between Uber and each
driver leads to price uniformity. If, as discussed in the prior
Subpart, the drivers are in an agreement with each other, that
agreement leads to the same price uniformity.
If Uber drivers are deemed to be in an agreement with each
other to price according to the Uber algorithm, this has poten-
tially profound consequences. 176 Agreements among competi-
tors about prices are ordinarily per se illegal. 177 Such a con-
clusion would make Uber's entire business model a violation
of section 1, giving rise to treble damage remedies and, theo-
retically, criminal exposure. 178
1. The Scope of the Per Se Rule
Although courts have most frequently applied the per se
rule against price fixing by competitors to classic cartels, they
have also applied the rule to less patently anticompetitive con-
duct. For example, the rule was articulated in United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., where there was no express agree-
ment over a set price. 179 In Socony-Vacuum, the Supreme
Court faced an agreement by major oil companies to coordi-
nate purchases from independent refiners to remove what the
defendants believed was excess production from the mar-
ket. 180 The Court upheld the criminal conviction of the defend-
ants, stating that "[u]nder the Sherman Act a combination
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depress-
ing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
176 See Nowag, supra note 3.
177 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223
(1940).
178 Section 1 violations all carry the potential for criminal penalties. As
a matter of practice and the application of prosecutorial discretion, however,
criminal penalties are almost exclusively sought in the context of what are
termed "hard core cartels"-agreements to fix price or output or to divide
markets that are formed in secret. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN-
TITRUST DIVISION MANUAL IV-12 (5th ed. 2017).
179 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 150.
180 Id. at 167.
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interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." 181 In Arizona
v. Maricopa County Medical Society, the defendant organiza-
tion of doctors promulgated maximum fees schedules that the
defendants asserted lowered the price of medical care. 182 The
Supreme Court applied the per se rule to this agreement de-
spite its alleged price reducing effects. 183 In Catalano, Inc. v.
Target Sales, Inc., the defendant beer wholesalers allegedly
agreed that they would demand payment at or prior to deliv-
ery to their retailer customers.184 Prior to this alleged agree-
ment, the defendants sometimes accepted payment several
weeks following delivery. 8 5 The Court of Appeals held that
this agreement was not subject to the per se rule against price
fixing. The Supreme Court reversed in a per curium holding,
"It is virtually self-evident that extending interest-free credit
for a period of time is equivalent to giving a discount equal to
the value of the use of the purchase price for that period of
time. Thus, credit terms must be characterized as an insepa-
rable part of the price." 186 These cases demonstrate little tol-
erance for horizontal agreements affecting prices.
The Supreme Court has declined to apply the per se rule in
some situations in which competitors have agreed to fixed a
price. In NCAA v. University of Oklahoma,187 the defendant
association of universities sold broadcast rights for football
games to television networks and fixed the prices for those
broadcast rights. 188 The Court did not apply the per se rule
despite the horizontal price fixing agreement, emphasizing
that the context required some form of horizontal cooperation.
"[W]hat is critical is that this case involves an industry in
which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the
181 Id. at 223.
182 Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342 (1982).
183 Id. at 348.
184 Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 644 (1980).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 648.
187 Nat'1 Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85 (1984).
188 Id. at 99-100.
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product is to be available at all." 189 Uber might argue that the
same is true in its situation. To the extent that its drivers are
deemed to be in an agreement with each other, Uber might
argue that at least some form of horizontal cooperation is nec-
essary for the ride service to be offered to consumers through
its app. 190
2. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, competing copyright hold-
ers agreed together to pool their copyrights and offer licensees
a blanket license to all of the copyrights in the pool. 191 The
defendants were required by a prior consent decree to accept
only nonexclusive licenses to the copyrighted music. 19 2 This
preserved competition among the copyright holders in licens-
ing individual copyrights. Of course, when the defendants of-
fered the blanket license created by their agreement to cus-
tomers, they needed to set a price for the blanket license.
Thus, the defendants were a group of competitors who got to-
gether and agreed to fix a price. The Court held that this
agreement was not per se illegal, and reasoned that the de-
fendants were not fixing the price of anything that they could
individually create and sell.193 Instead, the defendants were
creating something new and selling it in competition with
their other individual offerings. "But the blanket license can-
not be wholly equated with a simple horizontal arrangement
among competitors. ASCAP does set the price for its blanket
license, but that license is quite different from anything any
individual owner could issue. The individual composers and
189 Id. at 101.
190 There are reports of off-platform coordination among Uber drivers
designed to manipulate the surge pricing algorithm. By jointly logging out
of the Uber app. during peak use times, drivers can cause the surge pricing
algorithm to kick in and increase the amount paid for rides. See generally
Le Chen et al., Peeking Beneath the Hood of Uber, FTC (Sept. 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public-comments/2015/09/
00011-97592.pdf [perma.cc/JKX8-JRX8].
191 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979).
192 Id. at 11.
193 Id. at 23.
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authors have neither agreed not to sell individually in any
other market nor use the blanket license to mask price fixing
in such other markets." 194
The implications of BMI for Uber and similar enterprises
are complex and important. Whether the suppliers in a shar-
ing economy enterprise like Uber engage in horizontal price
fixing subject to the per se rule or produce a previously un-
known product or service, invoking the rule of reason, may be
determinative of the viability of these enterprises. The Uber
arrangement has introduced a new set of suppliers to the mar-
ket. Uber's agreements with both drivers and riders allow
drivers to offer rides in a way not previously practicable. It
adds capacity to the marketplace, exerting downward pres-
sures on prices in markets previously served only by regulated
taxis. However, it is a leap to conclude that the Uber enter-
prise creates something that the individual drivers could not
produce on their own. Any individual ride is provided by one
driver for one price. Unlike BMI, the rider is not purchasing
unlimited rides from a group of drivers for a single fee. Uber
drivers are not cooperating to create a bundle of rides to be
purchased by a rider. A single ride is something that a single
driver could theoretically offer to a rider. On the other hand,
that single driver could not realistically find the rider who
wants that particular ride without a matching company like
Uber, and Uber could not offer that service without agree-
ments with multiple drivers.
3. The Ancillarity Doctrine
BMI can be characterized as an application of a body of law
called the ancillarity doctrine. The doctrine was set forth by
William Howard Taft when he was a judge on the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in U.S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co.195 At the time, courts were struggling with how to incor-
porate a reasonableness requirement into section 1 analysis
without allowing cartelists to argue that the price they had
194 Id. at 23-24.
195 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898).
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fixed was reasonable. 196 Then Judge Taft offered the ancillar-
ity doctrine as an analytical tool to solve this problem. He held
that restraints of trade should be lawful if they reasonably
furthered the purposes of a lawful contract. 197 He explained,
for example, that a covenant not to compete would be lawful
if it was reasonably ancillary to the sale of a business. 198 Of
course, the price fixed by a cartel is not ancillary to any other
lawful contract, and would thus be illegal. BMIis an easy case
under the ancillarity doctrine. The copyright holders agreed
together to create the blanket license. The challenged price
agreement merely put a price on this new product. The blan-
ket license could not be sold without a price. Therefore, the
agreement to create the price was reasonably ancillary to the
lawful purpose of introducing the blanket license to the mar-
ket.
If the ancillarity doctrine is applied to the sharing economy
arrangements, some outcomes are easy and some are more an-
alytically challenging. Airbnb imposes restrictions on its prop-
erty owners regarding health and safety, disclosure of various
characteristics of the property, a customer review regime, and
antidiscrimination rules. All such agreements can be de-
fended as reasonably ancillary to the lawful purpose of match-
ing renters with property owners. Airbnb does not impose a
pricing agreement on its property owners. Similarly, Uber
drivers agree to a series of contract terms that seem reasona-
bly ancillary to the lawful purpose of matching drivers to rid-
ers. These include terms related to insurance, driving record,
nature of the vehicle, and method of payment. However, the
tougher question under the ancillarity doctrine is whether the
agreement to charge the price determined by the Uber pricing
algorithm is reasonably ancillary to the matching service pro-
vided by Uber.
The reasonableness of the connection between a price
agreement and lawful contractual purpose varies by context.
In BMI, the contractual purpose of selling the blanket license
196 See e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S.
290 (1897); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
197 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 282.
198 Id. at 281.
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could not be accomplished without the price agreement. If
Airbnb property owners agreed about the price of their rental
properties, such an agreement would not be reasonably ancil-
lary to the matching service offered by Airbnb. Renters using
Airbnb often book their reservations days, weeks, or months
in advance. They have plenty of time to consider various prop-
erties prior to booking. This comparison involves location,
property type, size, amenities, and, of course, price. Property
owners compete regarding all of these aspects of the transac-
tion. The context of Uber transactions is different. First, the
rides offered by Uber drivers are more uniform than proper-
ties offered by Airbnb owners. Most importantly, all of the
competing Uber drivers are offering a ride to and from the
rider's selected locations. Second, the Uber rider is booking
their ride much closer in time to the provision of the driving
service. Third, the Uber booking process is very quick. i
Do the temporal aspects of the Uber transaction make the
pricing agreement reasonably ancillary to the matching ser-
vice? Reducing the number of variables contributes to the
speed of negotiating a contract. When a consumer purchases
a carton of milk in the checkout line of a grocery store, very
few contract terms need to be individually negotiated. The
transaction takes place very quickly. When a commercial ten-
ant rents an office building, many terms need to be individu-
ally negotiated. The transaction takes more time. Eliminating
price competition among Uber drivers contributes to the speed
of the matching transaction. However, that does not neces-
sarily make the agreement to charge the same price reasona-
bly ancillary. Price competition is at the core of a market econ-
omy. That centrality is the reason for the per se rule against
price fixing. An argument that price competition needs to be
eliminated faces a high hurdle.
4. Fast Sharing Economy Transactions Without
Price Fixing
Could the matching service provided by Uber be accom-
plished while maintaining price competition among Uber driv-
ers? Theoretically, a rider could solicit offers from Uber driv-
ers after identifying the starting and ending points of the
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desired ride. Uber drivers could engage in an online auction
to identify which driver is willing to offer the ride for the low-
est price. This auction could be limited to a short period of
time. If this process is practical, then the agreement to charge
the price specified by the Uber algorithm would not be reason-
ably ancillary to the matching service provided by Uber. On
its face, the practicality of such an auction seems doubtful.
The prospect of Uber drivers generating competing bids, pos-
sibly while driving, seems awkward at best. However, it may
be possible to simplify the process without agreeing to abide
by the Uber algorithm price. The bidding process would be
much simpler if the price determined by the Uber algorithm
was just the starting point for the negotiation.1 99 Drivers
could then bid by offering percentage discounts off (or in-
creases above) the Uber algorithm price. Drivers could decide
in advance that they would always bid a certain percentage
below (or above) the Uber algorithm price. Presumably this
discount (or surcharge) could be specified in advance by each
driver and automated into the bidding process. Under these
conditions, the bidding process might be rapid and relatively
painless. If that is so, the current agreement to charge the
price determined by the Uber algorithm would not be reason-
ably ancillary to the provision of the matching service, and the
per se rule against horizontal price fixing would apply.
C. If the Uber Arrangement Is Not Per Se Illegal, Who
Bears What Burdens Under the Rule of Reason?
It is possible that Uber may succeed in avoiding the appli-
cation of the per se rule against horizontal price fixing. If so,
the rule of reason would apply. As discussed in Part III, the
application of the rule of reason requires the shifting of bur-
dens between the plaintiff and the defendant on three ques-
tions. 200 The plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrat-
ing the likelihood of anticompetitive effects. If the plaintiff
establishes that likelihood, the burden shifts to the defendant
199 The authors are grateful to Professor Benjamin Cover for this sug-
gestion.
200 See supra text accompanying notes 127-143.
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to present a procompetitive justification. If the defendant does
so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the an-
ticompetitive effects outweigh the procompetitive effects.
The agreement among Uber drivers to charge the price de-
termined by the Uber pricing algorithm creates a sufficient
likelihood of anticompetitive effects that the plaintiffs could
quickly meet their burden on the threshold question. A hori-
zontal agreement regarding price is as likely to have anticom-
petitive effects as the agreements in the three cases where the
Supreme Court quickly determined that the plaintiffs met
their initial burden. In Professional Engineers, the Court
quickly concluded that the association's rule prohibiting com-
petitive bidding was sufficiently likely to be anticompetitive
that the defendants needed to offer a procompetitive justifica-
tion.201 In Indiana Federation of Dentists, the Court quickly
concluded that the agreement to refuse to supply x-rays to the
insurance companies was similarly likely to be anticompeti-
tive and similarly required a justification from the defend-
ants.202 Finally, in NCAA, the Court held that the associa-
tion's agreement to limit the number of televised games and
determine a price for packages of games was sufficiently likely
to have anticompetitive effects that the plaintiff had carried
their burden on the initial question under the rule of rea-
son.20 3 An agreement among Uber drivers regarding the price
to charge riders is similarly likely to have anticompetitive ef-
fects. Such a conclusion would shift to Uber the burden of pre-
senting a procompetitive justification.
Faced with this burden, Uber would offer the procompeti-
tive effects of the entry into the market for rides that its app
creates. However, the difficulty for Uber would be linking
these procompetitive effects to the agreement on price. The
massive entry of drivers into the ride market is of course sig-
nificantly procompetitive. However, U~ber would bear the bur-
den of establishing a causal nexus between the procompetitive
201 Nat'1 Soc'y of Prof' Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 694-95
(1978).
202 FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986).
203 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984).
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effects of entry and the agreement on price. In NCAA, the
Court addressed a similar issue. The association argued that
creating a balance of athletic talent among teams served a
procompetitive interest of enhancing the quality of the prod-
uct it offered. 204 The Court agreed. 205 However, the Court con-
cluded that there was no logical connection between this pro-
competitive effect and the restriction on television broadcasts
that the association adopted. 206 Therefore, the presence of a
procompetitive effect justifies a restraint on competition only
if there is a logical nexus between the procompetitive effect
and the restraint. The procompetitive effects of the market en-
try resulting from the Uber app would justify the price agree-
ment only if there was a logical nexus between the entry and
the price agreement. Uber bears the burden of establishing
this nexus. The possibility of this nexus might be enough to
justify avoiding the application of the per se rule against price
fixing. However, like in NCAA, the possibility might exist, but
when the defendant is called upon to establish the presence of
the nexus rather than its mere possibility, the defendant
might fail.
If Uber succeeded in establishing the logical nexus be-
tween the price agreement and the market entry facilitated by
its app, the burden would shift back to the plaintiff to show
that the anticompetitive effects outweigh the procompetitive
effects. If the procompetitive entry logically depended on the
price agreement, the plaintiff would not be able to successfully
bear this burden. In such a case, the market entry would not
occur without the price agreement. The price agreement thus
limits only competition that would not occur at all in the ab-
sence of the agreement.
204 Id. at 117.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 117-19.
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V. LESSONS FOR THE STRUCTURE OF A
SHARING ECONOMY ENTERPRISE
Part IV shows that when applying black-letter antitrust
law to different sharing economy enterprises, the terms im-
posed by different platforms influence the antitrust treat-
ment. The primary analysis in Part IV discusses the Uber
platform and its terms of service, including the de facto no ne-
gotiation price term. It concludes, first, that those terms and
conditions lead to a horizontal agreement among the drivers
regarding price. Second, the possibility that price identity is
required for the Uber system to work makes per se treatment
inappropriate. Third, under a quick look version of the rule of
reason, Uber would be required to establish such a logical
nexus between the price identity agreement and the efficiency
of its system.
In this Part, this Article provides a novel structure for an-
alyzing the antitrust standard to apply to a sharing economy
enterprise. 207 Subpart A establishes a comprehensive frame-
work for distinguishing among sharing economy enterprises
based on two variables: the degree of sharing of risk among
the actors and the extent and subject matter of the coordina-
tion among them. Subpart B draws generalizable lessons for
sharing economy enterprise structure.
A. Diagramming Section 1 Conduct
The approach stated here is more willing than traditional
antitrust law to treat both sets of variables as matters of de-
gree rather than categorical rules. Regarding the degree of
risk-sharing, current antitrust law treats the "single entity"
question as a binary distinction. 208 A single entity is exempt
from scrutiny under section 1, while multiple entities are sub-
ject to the application of section 1 when they agree with each
207 The analysis here is likely generalizable to non-sharing-economy
enterprises. We postpone that generalization to another article.
208 See Mark Anderson, The Enigma of the Single Entity, 16 U. PA. J.
Bus. L. 497, 507-08 (2014) (discussing the rule of per se legality for intra-
firm agreements).
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other. This existing categorical approach leaves sharing econ-
omy enterprises subject to the full range of section 1 assess-
ment since actors within such enterprises do not share profits
and losses to such an extent that they meet the categorical
approach of existing antitrust law.
Current antitrust law also imposes categorical rules re-
garding the extent and subject matter of the coordination
among actors.209 Some types of coordination among some
types of actors are illegal per se. This Article argues that such
categorical distinctions are inappropriate when applied to
sharing economy enterprises. Rather, the extent of coordina-
tion should be viewed as a matter of degree and compared to
the extent of risk-sharing. Even price fixing among competi-
tors may be acceptable if the degree of risk-sharing is suffi-
ciently extensive.
Figure 1 graphically portrays the interaction of two varia-
bles: coordinated behavior and risk-sharing. 210 Coordination
of behavior by potentially competing economic actors threat-
ens the efficiency that competition promotes. Section 1 sub-
jects coordinated actions to scrutiny because of this threat. On
the other hand, risk-sharing by economic actors has the po-
tential to promote efficiency. At the extreme of risk-sharing,
the single entity fiction protects some forms of coordinated ac-
tions from section 1 scrutiny. Although the single entity fic-
tion is nominally addressed to the conduct element, it is based
on the likelihood of procompetitive effects. The sharing of prof-
its and losses that is at the core of the single entity fiction in-
centivizes the maximization of revenues and minimization of
costs (i.e., economically efficient behavior). Risk-sharing short
of complete sharing of profits and losses may also promote eco-
nomic efficiency. Sharing economy enterprises involve varying
amounts of risk-sharing and varying levels of coordination.
209 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979).
210 The graph is more than a sliding scale of pricing restrictions. The
primary contribution of this Part is illustrating and providing intuition as
to the interplay between the pricing control variable and the risk-sharing
variable.
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The point of this Article is that antitrust law should allow in-
creased levels of coordination when a sharing economy enter-
prise involves increased levels of risk-sharing. This Article ex-
plains the graph in detail before plotting the locations of
leading sharing economy enterprises based on an assessment
of their contract terms with suppliers in Subpart B.
FIGURE 1: RISK-SHARING VS. COORDINATION
Integration without
Y-axis: coordination (non-
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1. X-Axis: Degree of Coordination
The X-axis represents the degree of coordination among
the constituent parts of the particular enterprise. At the ex-
treme end, where X approaches infinity, coordination among
the constituent parts is complete and relates to the most com-
petitively sensitive matters. At the junction with the Y-axis,
where X approaches 0, coordination is reduced and the sub-
jects of coordination become less competitively sensitive.
With regard to activity taking place on the X-axis, where
Y=0, there is no sharing of risk between the constituent parts
of the enterprise-the parts are in competition and gain no
efficiency from their coordination. Thus, at the far left end
where (X,Y)=0, there is perfect competition among individual
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firms each pursuing their own best interest without regard to
other firms. In economics textbooks, this is frequently re-
flected in a market for commodities, such as wheat, with at-
omistic producers and consumers, ease of entry and exit, and
perfect information. 211
Moving to the right on the X-axis (Y=O, X>O), the degree of
coordination increases, requiring an analysis of the degree of
harm from the observed conduct. A small X represents harm-
less coordination. Real world examples might include compet-
ing firms' sharing information that is not competitively sensi-
tive or sharing past information that has been rendered
anonymous. 212 Such exchanges of information are unlikely to
lead to any harmful marketplace effects. In practical terms, a
plaintiff bringing a rule of reason case alleging conduct with
small X will be unable to bear its burden of proving likelihood
of harm, and a defendant will be able to rest without its own
demonstration of procompetitive effect. 213
Beyond the very minimal coordination, as Y=0 and X in-
creases, enterprises are subject to higher scrutiny, which
leads to the quick look rule of reason.214 When enterprises
lack any risk-sharing among their constituent parts but in-
volve coordination on competitively sensitive matters, plain-
tiffs will increasingly be able to demonstrate harm and even-
tually rely on the presumption of harm provided by the quick
look rule.2 15 Such a presumption arises, for example, when
distinct firms providing dental care, not sharing risk, reach an
agreement not to provide x-rays to insurers. 216
211 See generally ROBERT PINDYCK & DANIEL RUBINFELD, MICROECONOM-
ICs (7th ed. 2014).
212 See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563,
586 (1925).
213 See supra Part III (discussing the burden shifting under the rule of
reason).
214 Since Cal. Dental, this has been understood to be a sliding scale ra-
ther than a binary rule-of-reason versus per-se distinction. See Cal. Dental
Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) ("an enquiry meet for the case").
215 See id. at 787-84 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (labeling "obvious" and not
"possible to deny" the anticompetitive tendencies of private agreements not
to advertise discounts).
216 See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1986).
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Finally, when the coordination touches on matters like
price, output, and product or geographic markets, which are
forbidden subjects of competitor coordination, it becomes sub-
ject to rules of per se illegality. Examples include an agree-
ment among service providers to divide geographic marketS 2 1 7
and an agreement among electronic book publishers to raise
the retail price of e-books. 218 Cartel conduct, giving rise to
criminal enforcement, exists at the extreme right end of the
X-axis. 21 9 The X-axis thus reflects a progression from no coor-
dination, passing through innocent coordination on harmless
matters and risky coordination, and eventually reaching
highly anticompetitive coordination among wholly unin-
tegrated entities.
2. Y-Axis: Sharing of Risk
The Y-axis represents the degree of risk-sharing among the
constituent parts of the particular sharing economy enter-
prise. At the end where Y approaches infinity, the constituent
parts are engaged in full sharing of profits and losses and are
acting as a single firm.220 At the junction with the X-axis,
where Y approaches 0, sharing of risk is reduced to the point
at which the constituent parts are engaged in vigorous com-
petition. Increased risk-sharing is an indicator of increasing
likelihood of efficiency. When an enterprise is comprised of in-
dependent competitors, incentives to maximize profits and
minimize losses across the entire enterprise are lacking. In-
creased risk-sharing within the enterprise incentivizes in-
creased efficiency; at the extreme end of risk-sharing, full
sharing of profits and losses, formerly independent competi-
tors, are fully invested their mutual success. Thus, as Y ap-
proaches infinity otherwise independent competitors may be
217 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08
(1972).
218 See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 339 (2d Cir. 2015).
219 See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1054 (N.D.
Ill. 1998) (upholding a jury verdict on price fixing conviction for the Archer
Daniels Midland executive).
220 Anderson, supra note 208 (defining single firm after American Nee-
dle, Inc. v. Nat'1 Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010)).
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treated as a single firm that is immune from antitrust scru-
tiny. 22 1 For example, fast food franchises and their common
franchisor have been treated as a single entity, although each
pursued its own economic interests.2 22
With regard to activity taking place along the Y-axis when
X=0, there is no coordination between the constituent parts of
the enterprise. Thus, at the point Y=0, the market is in a state
of perfect competition. As Y increases, there is an increase in
risk-sharing among the constituent parts. At the extreme end,
where Y approaches infinity, risk-sharing is complete and the
constituent parts are sharing profits and losses. At that point,
increased coordination is also extremely likely. If actors agree
to share risk, they are also likely to coordinate their activities.
This coordination could take the form of shared and equal con-
trol, like in a partnership. It could also take the form of cen-
tralized management accompanied by fiduciary duties, as in a
corporation. 22 3
221 See Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1147
(9th Cir. 2003) ("The single-entity rule is relevant in a variety of contexts.
It applies to a company and its officers, employees and wholly owned sub-
sidiaries."). Cf. American Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 191 ("concerted action
under § 1 does not turn simply on whether the parties involved are legally
distinct entities"); PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW IT 1466-1467 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining that parent and non-wholly-
owned subsidiaries can be accorded single firm treatment). The District
Court in In re Term Commodities Cotton Futures Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 145955, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014), recognized that Copper-
weld's bright-line rule did not accommodate all circumstances of risk-shar-
ing among firms that might provide a basis for making a single entity de-
termination. "[W]hen lower courts are faced with the question of whether
an affiliated, but not wholly owned, corporation can conspire with its parent
in violation of § 1, they must draw from the analysis in Copperweld without
the benefit of a bright line rule." Id. at *13.
222 Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada, 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1031 (D. Nev.
1992), aff'd, 999 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
223 Holding X at 0, the likelihood that an enterprise will exist decreases
as Y increases. It is unlikely that firms will exist at a point where X=0 and
Y is significantly greater than 0. Any such risk-sharing would be economi-
cally suspect in the absence of increased coordination of activities. Examples
might be found in industries in which competing firms independently adopt
a new input into their manufacturing process in the hopes that the new
input reflects "the future" of the industry. Such an input might include a
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3. The Line (X,Y)=O to (X,Y) -- oo: Perfect
Competition to Single Entity
The graph in Figure 1 reflects a 45-degree line extending
from (X,Y)=0 to (X,Y)-*o. At a high level of generalization,
that line divides conduct that is likely to be a section 1 viola-
tion from conduct that is unlikely to present an antitrust con-
cern. All conduct that is illegal per se or subject to a quick look
rule of reason analysis lies significantly below and to the right
of the line. All conduct undertaken by a single entity, which is
therefore immune from antitrust scrutiny, lies above and to
the left of the line.
Conduct that lies near this line is ambiguous as to its an-
titrust treatment. It is subject to the rule of reason, reflecting
the existence of both (1) potential competitive harm and (2)
potential efficiency benefits. As conduct deviates from the line
to the upward and leftward, there is a greater degree of risk-
sharing and a lesser degree of coordination. As the efficiency
incentives of risk-sharing increasingly overbear the potential
for competitive harm from coordination, conduct moves into
an antitrust safety zone. A non-sharing economy example of
conduct that would diagram to the upper left of the line is
standard-setting behavior. Firms may coordinate on conduct
new technology, such as electric power in automobiles or touch screens in
smartphones. It might include a new manufacturing process, such as robot-
ics. Or it might include a new location, such as restaurants and shops that
make bets on a community's future economic development. These examples
of investment based on independent hope, which happens to be shared
among many, reflect the closest approximations of risk-sharing without co-
ordination among the participants. Of course, in all of these examples, coor-
dination may exist. Technology adoption can occur through standard-set-
ting and joint research and development; manufacturing processes can be
the subject of trade association discussions; investments in geography can
be incentivized by states or localities seeking to encourage local develop-
ment. The lightly shaded triangle in the upper left corner of Figure 1 reflects
the extreme unlikelihood of complete sharing of profits and losses among
individuals or atomistic firms without coordination of their activities. This
would be a hypothetical single firm that fails to engage in coordination
among its constituent parts. A firm in that triangle would be engaged in
compete risk-sharing with no coordination. It is likely that any such firm
would not exist for long.
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that is highly competitively sensitive, like a decision to cease
competing on innovation, but because standard setting re-
flects a joint commitment to the success of the standard, it re-
flects motion upward on the Y-axis and is generally permitted
by antitrust law. 224
As conduct deviates from the line to the downward and
rightward, there is a lesser degree of risk-sharing and a
greater degree of coordination. This presents increased con-
cern for harm to competition outweighing the efficiency incen-
tives of risk-sharing. A non-sharing economy example of con-
duct to the lower right side of the line is an agreement among
credit card issuers not to compete against their joint venture
card network by entering into agreements with a third party
card network.225 Such an agreement is not illegal per se, be-
cause it does not reflect an agreement on matters of extreme
competitive sensitivity, but it does reflect coordination in ex-
cess of the risk-sharing among the parties to the agreement.
The direction of the line demonstrates that as risk-sharing
increases, the degree of coordination among constituent parts
of an enterprise that will be tolerated also increases. At the
extreme end where (X,Y) approaches infinity, a single firm
may engage in the same conduct that would be illegal per se
were it engaged in by a set of competitors.
B. Graphing Exemplar Sharing Economy Enterprises
Sharing economy enterprises like TaskRabbit involve little
more than fees paid for matching services and back-office sup-
port, facilitating transactions between providers and consum-
ers. In the absence of agreements on competitively sensitive
transaction terms, these enterprises easily survive a rule of
reason inquiry. Platforms like Uber and Lyft control many of
the transaction terms including price, which is commonly con-
sidered the most competitively sensitive term. As shown
224 See 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (dictating that the rule of reason standard ap-
plies to "standards development organization[s]").
225 See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir.
2003).
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above, these enterprises warrant quick look scrutiny under
section 1.226
Sharing economy enterprises in between those extremes
are subject to the section 1 rule of reason, an "enquiry meet
for the case." 22 7 Justice Souter's phrase reflects the reality
that the rule of reason is a sliding scale, where the more com-
petitively sensitive the contract terms involved, the greater
the attention paid to the enterprise. With Uber and TaskRab-
bit as the extremes, it is possible to assess the sharing econ-
omy enterprise structure in relative terms. The closer in form
to Uber, the more searching the rule of reason analysis. For
instance, Lyft (with its established, but alterable, price terms)
is close to Uber-level scrutiny, while Airbnb (with its minimal
control over transaction terms) is closer to the hands-off ap-
proach accorded to TaskRabbit. This rule of reason inquiry, a
226 It helps to reproduce here Table 1 from Part II of this Article. See
supra Part II, at 13.
Table 1 (reproduced) Uber Lyft ABB CS TR
Establishes a price for the service X X X
or product provided
Controls the method of payment X X X X
over the platform
Maintains a functionality for prod- X X X X X
uct or service reviews
Sets minimum requirements for X
the supplier's personal or real
property used in the transaction
Sets requirements meant to en- X
sure compliance with accessibility
and other civil rights laws
Disclaims control over suppliers, X X
including their manner of perform-
ing a service or providing a prod-
uct
Collects taxes imposed by a partic- X
ular locality
Ensures that realistic alternative X X
means exist for suppliers to reach
consumers I
227 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).
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matter of degree rather than a categorical distinction, re-
quires substantial judicial inquiry into the competitive sensi-
tivity of the subject of the agreement.
However, this is only half of the analysis. In Part III, the
Article also shows that a single firm may engage internally in
a broad range of agreements on the most competitively sensi-
tive terms without even having its behavior assessed under
section 1.228 By definition, sharing economy enterprises are
not single entities.229 The limits of the Coasean definition of a
firm in a world of hyper-efficient transactions, described in
Part II, suggest that the doctrinal single entity analysis is not
sufficiently nuanced. This Article therefore treats the single
entity concept in a sharing economy enterprise as an "enquiry
meet for the case," rather than a binary distinction. 230 After
judging the competitive sensitivity of a particular set of coor-
dinating agreements defining an enterprise, it is necessary to
judge the degree of risk-sharing among the suppliers. At the
extreme of risk-sharing, if, for example, an enterprise is de-
termined actually to employ its suppliers, the enterprise be-
comes a single firm and is immune from scrutiny. Short of sin-
gle entity treatment, high levels of risk-sharing justify high
levels of coordination.
The antitrust treatment of sharing economy enterprises
becomes apparent when they are placed on the Figure 1 graph
on the basis of (1) the extent and nature of the coordination
among the constituent parts of the enterprise and (2) the de-
gree of risk-sharing involved in the enterprise. Using Figure
2, below, to depict these relationships, this Subpart considers
the placement of the leading examples from Part II and what
that means for their antitrust treatment. These examples in-
clude:
228 See supra Part III.
229 See supra Part II.
230 The traditional single entity analysis is binary, turning on the shar-
ing of profits and losses or lack thereof. See Anderson, supra note 213, at
527-28.
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* Uber (and Lyft);
* Airbnb (and Couchsurfing); and
* Task Rabbit.
Location on the graph is an imprecise determination. How-
ever, Figure 2, below, reflects likely placements for these ex-
amples. The remainder of this Subpart explains this judgment
with respect to each firm.
FIGURE 2: PLATFORM PLACEMENT ON RISK-SHARING/
COORDINATION GRAPH
Y-axis:
degree of
sharing of
risk Air B&8 Couhsufing-
Lyft ber
sk Rab t:
X-axis: degree of
coordination
1. TaskRabbit
TaskRabbit is a sharing economy enterprise that exists
well in the antitrust safety zone because of the near lack of
coordination among its suppliers. Table 1231 shows coordina-
tion on only two factors: the manner of making payment and
the collection and dissemination of reviews of quality and re-
liability for the participants on the platform. Neither present
serious competitive concerns. For example, if two plumbers
(suppliers of services of the sort marketed through the
TaskRabbit platform) reached an agreement to create a joint
231 Table 1, supra note 226.
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venture to process payments or to advertise their respective
consumer satisfaction, the rule of reason scrutiny would be
minimal. Operating through the TaskRabbit platform adds ef-
ficiency to any such coordination while in no way adding to
the competitive concern. The TaskRabbit enterprise therefore
maps to a low point on the X-axis, below all of the other exam-
ples and nearly in the zone of antitrust irrelevance. 2 32
2. Uber
Uber presents the greatest concern for coordination and
lowest likelihood of efficiency produced by risk-sharing among
the constituent parts of the enterprise. Coordination in the
case of Uber occurs on a matter of maximum sensitivity-the
price charged for the services provided. Uber's coordinating
conduct is so concerning that it would be per se illegal price
fixing if there was no risk-sharing.
Using the coordination versus risk-sharing paradigm, the
Uber enterprise escapes such per se condemnation because of
the degree of risk-sharing among the drivers. Suppliers on the
Uber platform are mutually invested in the platform's success,
without which they are individually unable to produce a taxi
like service that is appealing to consumers. That is for at least
three reasons. First, in the absence of the platform, which in
turn can only exist at substantial scale, suppliers do not have
a realistic means of matching their services with the demand
for one-off ride hailing.2 33 Second, the platform, operating at
scale, permits the creation of reliable reputations through op-
232 The TaskRabbit enterprise also maps to a relatively low Y.
TaskRabbit suppliers operate in industries that are traditionally populated
by small firms or sole proprietorships. Plumbers, painters, builders, and
handymen frequently market their services on an individual basis, using
traditional marketing channels. In most cases, TaskRabbit likely serves as
little more than an additional marketing channel and an efficient payments
provider. The platform's success or lack thereof is likely not sufficiently
meaningful to affect the success, or lack thereof, of its suppliers.
233 Less successful examples of unregulated taxi service include appeal-
ing to arriving passengers at airports. Those efforts fail to produce a mean-
ingful market for unregulated taxis.
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portunities to rate suppliers. Third, the platform permits reg-
ulatory disruption by achieving sufficient scale and public ap-
peal to discourage its being subjected to potentially harmful
regulatory interference.
Uber drivers are strongly invested in the success of the en-
terprise, a degree of risk-sharing that should move the enter-
prise far enough along the Y-axis to escape per se condemna-
tion. Under a quick look rule of reason analysis, the Uber
enterprise would be required to show the benefits to competi-
tion stemming from its enterprise structure before a plaintiff
would be required to show net harm. This conclusion is con-
sistent with the classical approach to analyzing Uber, de-
scribed in Part IV, with one analytical difference. Under the
classical approach, Uber's procompetitive argument would
hinge on the logical nexus between the price identity agree-
ment and the efficiency of the Uber operating model.2 34 Under
the approach suggested here, Uber's procompetitive argument
would be that the competitively sensitive level of coordination
is justified by the likelihood of efficiencies incentivized by the
level of mutual risk-sharing. 2 35
234 See supra text accompanying notes 195-202.
235 Lyft follows a similar business model to Uber. However, there has
historically been an important difference: the Lyft app explicitly permits
tipping. Tipping permits price negotiation above an established floor. Uber's
move to add a tipping function to its app eliminates this disparity going
forward. In the presence of tipping, the apps increase competition among
drivers for consumer dollars above the price floor. However, a tipping option
does not eliminate the competitive concern. In the absence of risk-sharing,
the Lyft agreement would still be treated as illegal per se. The pricing var-
iability tipping introduces merely moves Lyft closer to zero on the X-axis.
Lyft takes advantage of the precise risk-sharing that the Uber enterprise
involves: suppliers are invested in the enterprise's success. The Lyft enter-
prise is subject to rule of reason treatment, likely less "quick" than its com-
petitor Uber. It is possible that a plaintiff challenging the Lyft agreement
under section 1 will need to show an upward effect on prices before Lyft
would bear the obligation to demonstrate the efficiencies flowing from the
enterprise structure.
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3. Airbnb
Airbnb maps to the lightly shaded "safety zone" on Figure
2. This reflects the reality that the coordination in the case of
Airbnb is largely limited to matters that are not competitively
sensitive. These include the manner of advertising, manner of
collecting payment, and requirements agreed to by service
providers on the Airbnb platform including insurance and lia-
bility for loss. The X-axis location for Airbnb is substantially
lower than that for either Uber or Lyft, both of which include
agreements on price, the matter of primary competitive sig-
nificance. An agreement among competitor lodging services-
for example, between the hotel chains Hilton and Sheraton-
to jointly advertise or create a billing and collections service
organization would be subject to full blown rule of reason
treatment. Under that approach, the plaintiff would not be
able to quickly shift the burden to the defendant to present a
procompetitive justification.
Determining the appropriate antitrust treatment for
Airbnb also requires a consideration of the degree of risk-shar-
ing among the suppliers on the platform. Airbnb suppliers are
invested in the platform to a degree similar to Uber and Lyft
suppliers. Like Uber drivers, Airbnb suppliers have alternate
means to market their properties, including word of mouth,
local rental agencies, and early-mover Vacation Rentals by
Owner, a platform not unlike Airbnb but less aggressive in
expansion and less effective in moving to mobile technol-
ogy. 236 Airbnb suppliers also depend heavily on reliability rat-
ings, not unlike Uber suppliers, for whom consumer trust is
paramount. The regulatory disruption benefit of the platform
is nearly a precise match to Uber; only at sufficient scale and
public investment in the platform can Airbnb avoid poten-
tially crippling regulatory interference in its operations. Hold-
ing Y constant between the two firms, but decreasing X to re-
flect non-sensitive matters of coordination in the case of
236 See VACATION RENTALS BY OWNER, http://www.vrbo.com
[perma.cc/FH4R-SFZG].
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Airbnb, moves the enterprise to the lightly shaded "safety
zone."
23 7
C. Summary
This Part states a more nuanced approach to determining
how section 1 should be applied to a particular sharing econ-
omy enterprise. Drawing on the understanding that the shar-
ing economy enterprise disrupts the Coasean firm, Part V
treats the question of whether an enterprise is a single entity,
and thus achieves the efficiencies of integration, as a sliding
scale from minimal risk-sharing to complete sharing of profits
237 Lesser known competitor "Couchsurfing" is a scaled back version of
Airbnb that allows comparable variability in listings. As distinct from
Airbnb, however, Couchsurfing imposes an agreed maximum price, set at
zero. Neither consumers nor suppliers may negotiate transaction terms that
involve an exchange of money for lodging. Intuition suggests that the only
effect of a zero price is to maintain prices lower than in its absence. How-
ever, antitrust law is clear that horizontally agreed maximum prices are as
pernicious as horizontally agreed minimum prices. Both interfere with the
price setting mechanisms of the free market by preventing individually ne-
gotiated transaction terms. As illustrations of the possible harm from the
Couchsurfing agreement, the effect of a zero price may be to discourage
quality improvements for which consumers of Couchsurfing services would
gladly pay. It may discourage would-be competitors from joining the plat-
form or even forming a competing platform, with the effect of reducing the
quantity of lodging services supplied. This counterintuitive result may sug-
gest a more comprehensive rethinking of section 1 standards as applied to
sharing economy firms. Couchsurfing suppliers are less coordinated on
other aspects of their providing services. The terms of service do not involve
a centralized payment mechanism. The zero-price agreement does not nec-
essarily mean there could be no centralized payment system. Couchsurfing
could take credit cards for damage deposits or as a means to improve relia-
bility ratings. They do not involve tax collection services. In sum, Couchsurf-
ing involves an agreement on a highly sensitive transaction term, the price,
but avoids agreement on a number of other transaction terms. It maps on
the X-axis to a point above Airbnb but below Uber and Lyft. On the Y-axis,
Couchsurfing maps below previous examples. The value of reliability rank-
ings and matching services is consistent with Airbnb and, like Airbnb, pos-
sibly greater than Uber and Lyft. The regulatory disruption value of the
platform, protecting its suppliers from regulatory interference, is not an is-
sue in a fee-free arrangement.
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and losses. Mapping sharing economy enterprises to the ap-
propriate point on the Y-axis is one step in the analysis. The
second step is to map the enterprises to the X-axis, based on
the extent and competitive sensitivity of the coordination they
impose. This analysis offers the promise of broad application
across the sharing economy.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article tackles the challenge of applying antitrust
law, now more than 125 years old, to the most modern of en-
terprise structures-the sharing economy enterprise. The dif-
ficulty is not small, as traditional concepts such as horizontal
versus vertical agreements and single entity versus combina-
tions of separate entities do not map well to the sharing econ-
omy. And this difficulty is not merely hypothetical. Current
litigation challenging the most well-known sharing economy
firm, Uber, has the potential to be momentous in nature. The
court has already held that the plaintiffs pleaded a horizontal
agreement. If the court were to decide that this agreement
was illegal per se, Uber would be forced to make a meaningful
alteration to its basic structure. Alternatively, if the court
were to decide that the agreement was subject to the quick
look rule of reason, Uber would be charged with the burden of
demonstrating meaningful procompetitive benefits and the
relevance of the complained-of pricing term to those benefits.
This Article also shows that every sharing economy enter-
prise has terms of service that might, in theory, be challenged
as a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. While not all of
these terms approach the competitive sensitivity of an agreed
price term, many, including those that specify the methods of
payment or the type and quality of the products or services
provided, do reflect agreements on matters that directly affect
consumer choice and welfare. However, these terms of service
enable sharing economy enterprises to succeed. They allow
consumers to form expectations about what they are buying
and how much it will cost-just like buying from a traditional
business firm-while benefiting from a large set of small sup-
pliers. The interaction between these consumers and small
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suppliers is made possible only by the sharing economy enter-
prise.
This Article advocates accommodating the innovative
structure of the sharing economy enterprise by altering anti-
trust analysis. Courts should assess the degree to which con-
stituent parts of sharing economy enterprises (1) share eco-
nomic risk and (2) coordinate their behavior on competitively
sensitive matters. Charting the degree of risk-sharing in rela-
tion to the degree of coordination on competitively sensitive
matters permits a determination of the appropriate antitrust
treatment. The process advocated here is more appropriate to
the disruptive enterprise structure that defines the sharing
economy.
